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Water is vital for supporting life and welfare. Worldwide, water 
resources are under high pressure and freshwater ecosystems have been 
degraded and even lost. These pressures are likely to be aggravated by 
climate change. To tackle ecosystem service degradation and loss, Payment 
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for Ecosystem Services (“PES”) arose in the environmental policy arena to 
address positive externalities, using a “carrot” rather than a “stick.”   
Nevertheless, much confusion remains regarding its concept and 
application since the theory has been built based upon different site-specific 
schemes applied throughout the world. This paper seeks to provide an 
overview of the key elements that characterize the theory of payments for 
ecosystem services, translated to watershed protection. It also aims to 
explore under which general situations the use of this policy is appropriate, 
as well as its potentials and constraints.  
The research was based on an extensive review of the existing 
literature on PES that analyzes payment schemes in detail, in both 
developed and developing countries. The conclusions indicate that PES 
entails hard tradeoffs and is appropriate for a limited set of conditions. 
Despite being limited in scope, PES can effectively fill the gaps where other 
policies are failing. Overall, PES is gaining momentum not because it is a 
catchphrase but because there is a real need for better ecosystem service 
management. 
I. Introduction
Life on Earth was formed and developed in water.  Civilizations have
developed near rivers and lakes throughout human history, and have relied 
on benefits provided by freshwater ecosystems in order to achieve economic 
development and welfare.  Drinking water is essential for the survival of 
humans and animals, as well as for the process of photosynthesis, thereby 
making primary production possible and supporting the whole food chain. 
Water also drives economic and social development since it is essential for 
food production and required in the commercial and industrial sector. 
Additionally, it is necessary for many forms of energy production, ranging 
from hydro power to cooling thermal systems and nuclear power stations. 
Aquatic ecosystems sustain fisheries and provide raw material for 
pharmaceutical products and bioengineering.  Freshwater ecosystems also 
provide nonmaterial benefits such as cultural, artistic, spiritual, recreational, 
and aesthetic services. 
However, humans are not the only “consumers” of water and other 
freshwater ecosystem benefits.  Nature is possibly the most important and 
voiceless user, as it depends upon water and well-running aquatic 
ecosystems in order to support services that deliver these benefits that are 
crucial for maintaining life and welfare.  Once the needs of a natural 
ecosystem are met, freshwater ecosystems provide a wide range of 
ecosystem services such as climate and hydrological regulation, nutrient 
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distribution and primary production, sheltering, breeding and habitat for 
several species, waste dilution and detoxification, and mitigation of natural 
hazards, as well as some commodities referred to previously.  To achieve 
these ends, both water quantity and quality are important because they are 
intricately related factors in the overall functioning of freshwater systems. 
As a result, adequate water supply underpins life and health and is 
fundamental for the maintenance of the whole ecosystem.  
Despite the significance and value of these benefits, in the past few 
decades water resources have been under high pressure, and freshwater 
ecosystems are among the most degraded — many have even been lost, as 
demonstrated by several assessment reports conducted on this topic.2  
Exponential human population growth, excessive patterns of consumption, 
economic development, and myopic views about the limits of natural capital 
are direct and indirect drivers of ecosystem degradation and loss, which are 
exacerbated by climate change.  The rate and extent to which ecosystems 
have been affected indicates that a new approach to the way we manage 
them is urgently required. 
The problem is aggravated by the inherent complexity of the subject, 
our limited knowledge of the dynamics between ecosystem structures and 
functions, our undervaluation of these services, and the nature of public 
goods of most ecosystem services.  Although our understanding of 
ecosystem links has dramatically improved in the last fourty years, there is 
still a long way to go.  Ecosystem services, other than commodities, are still 
undervalued in our economy and policymaking.  When these services are not 
assessed and valued, there are few chances that they will play a significant 
role, if any, in decisionmaking.  Without this information, we are likely to 
continue making choices and tradeoffs myopically based solely on 
immediate human needs.  Finally, the inherent characteristics of public 
goods of most ecosystem services subject them to both over-consumption 
and under-production.  
To cope with such a complex problem, we need to adopt complex 
solutions which usually involve several approaches.  The traditional toolbox 
of policies applied for environmental protection range from traditional 
command and control to economic incentives.  As they are being tested in 
empirical situations, scholars have presented their advantages and 
2. See e.g., ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS, 
VOLUME 1 (Rashid Hassan et al., eds., Island Press 2005); WATER IN A CHANGING WORLD 
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disadvantages, as well as presenting educated opinions as to under which 
situations each policy is more appropriate.  In the 1980s, Payments for 
Ecosystem Services (“PES”) emerged in the forefront as the newest 
conservation policy tool.  This tool was designed to address the case of 
under valuation of ecosystem services.  As a result, this policy relies strongly 
on positive incentives represented by a carrot rather than a stick.   
Initially received as a win-win solution to achieve sustainable 
development and environmental protection, PES is a policy that, instead, 
recognizes hard trade-offs.  Because this approach is new and its theory has 
been built using several different schemes that are currently being tested 
around the world much confusion remains regarding the concept and 
application of this policy.  There is no agreement in the literature regarding 
the concept of ecosystem services.3  Nevertheless, based on the description 
of its key elements, it is possible to draw conclusions and place this policy 
in a distinctive and unique position in the policy podium.  This paper seeks 
to provide an overview of the key elements that characterize the theory of 
payments for ecosystem services, translated to watershed protection.  It also 
aims to appropriate situations for its application, as well as its potentials 
and constraints.  
The research was based on an extensive review of the existing 
literature on PES that thoughtfully analyzes payment schemes in both 
developed and developing countries.  Notwithstanding that service 
characteristics are site specific and that institutional arrangements vary 
among countries, some key elements must be in place in order to identify 
the policy and ensure its effectiveness.  The situations in which this policy is 
appropriate are also common throughout the various approaches.  This 
framework is valuable for policy makers aiming to introduce payment 
schemes to protect or enhance freshwater ecosystem service provisions, 
particularly in Brazil, which recently introduced a bill in Congress to regulate 
payments for ecosystem services4 and is already testing some pilot projects 
for watershed protection.5 
3. See different conceptualizations presented in Chapter 8.
4. PL n. 792 of 2007, http://www.camara.gov.br/sileg/integras/453221.pdf (last
visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
5. Currently, there are several pilot projects for watershed protection being
tesed in different states of Brazil. They are being implemented according to the 
framework of “Produtores de Água” Program, established by Agencia Nacional de 
Aguas (“ANA”), a federal governmental agency in charge of managing water 
resources. See http://www.ana.gov.br/produagua/. 
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This paper is organized in two parts.  The first part consists of three 
sections.  Sections A and B describe ecosystems and their complexities, 
providing an overview of how the expression “ecosystem services” was 
coined.  In Section C the focus narrows down to water resources and 
freshwater ecosystem services, providing data and examples according to 
the four categories of services adopted in the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment: provisioning, regulating, cultural, and supporting services.  This 
chapter ends with an outline of the drivers of change imposing pressures on 
ecosystem services.   
The second part begins with an analysis of the challenges in designing 
policies for environmental protection, investigating how the inherent 
complexity of ecosystems and the concepts of public goods and externalities 
translate to policy design, the difficulties of ecosystem services economic 
valuation, and the different methods currently available).  These concepts 
set the stage to explore the toolkit of policies available for environmental 
protection and PES, particularly Payments for Watershed Services (“PWS”). 
This paper intends to address the following issues: how payments for 
ecosystem services fit within the policy toolkit; what are the basic features of 
payments for ecosystem services; under which circumstances are they 
appropriate; and what are the possibilities and caveats.  Section D provides 
a historical analysis of the onset of this policy, while section E provides a 
conceptual definition and classification.  Section F investigates, in detail, 
each element that is crucial for the definition and identification of this 
approach as a new policy tool.  Section G explores the fundamental role of 
law in the effectiveness of this policy.  Section H examines the general 
conditions under which payments for ecosystem services are appropriate 
and concludes by exploring the potentials and trade-offs involved.  
II. Ecosystem Services
A. Ecosystems and Their Interactions
It is appropriate to begin explaining what “ecosystem services” denote 
by addressing what ecosystems are.  In simple terms, ecosystems are 
systems of living organisms, their physical environment and their 
interactions.6  All living organisms interact and depend on each other, and 
these interactions make energy flows and matter cycles throughout all four 
natural spheres — troposphere, atmosphere, hydrosphere and biosphere. 
6. JOHN C. NAGLE & J. B. RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM 
MANAGEMENT 318 (Foundation Press 2006). 
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The expression “ecosystem” was coined in 1935 by the British ecologist 
George Tansley (1871-1955) and is used to describe either a distinct 
geographic unit of nature, such as a watershed or a forest; a functional unit, 
such as nitrogen cycling; or a management unit like a national park.7  
Adopting the concept described above, an ecosystem may be explained as 
ranging from a drop of water to the entire biosphere.8  Conceived as physical 
entities, the geography of ecosystems does not always correspond to the 
way in which the political and social landscape is divided9 and does not 
always have precise boundaries that determine where one ecosystem ends 
and another begins.10  Furthermore, ecosystems are referred to as examples 
of “complex adaptive systems,” which means in a state of constant 
disequilibrium.11, 12  Given these challenges the law and policy of ecosystem 
management requires the adoption of parameters and metrics to identify 
what is being studied and managed.  To solve the problem of imprecise 
boundaries the most promising method adopts certain key factors that 
strongly influence ecological processes known as “controlling factors.”13  For 
the management to be effective both the metrics and the approach must be 
attuned with the policy objectives, and that is when the challenge increases. 
In order to best allocate scarce resources among different and competing 
needs, policymakers need to make choices based on reliable data; 
unfortunately such reliable data is rarely available. 
Well functioning ecosystems are directly related to well functioning 
biogeochemical cycles.  Keeping in mind the open nature of their processes, 
the outputs of one ecosystem can be part of the inputs of another 
ecosystem.  For this system to work correctly, diversity among the organisms 
within the biosphere plays a key role.14  Biological diversity, or biodiversity, 
refers to the “variability among living organisms from all sources including, 
inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological 
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, 
7. John M. Blair et al., Ecosystems as Functional Units in Nature, 14 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV’T 150 (Winter 2000). 
8. NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 6, at 318.
9. Id. at 319.
10. Blair et al., supra note 7, at 151.
11. J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 18 (2007).
12. Under the “new ecology” concept, short-term disturbances and long term
changes drives ecosystems into a complex and dynamic state of adaptation to these 
perturbations. See NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 6, at 347. 
13. Examples are vegetation, fauna, soil and watershed. See RUHL ET AL., supra
note 11, at 22. 
14. NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 6, at 347.
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between species and of ecosystems.”15  Early studies demonstrated that 
species diversity is vital in the resilience of ecosystems and directly related 
to services provided by nature.16  Resilience is a key property of both social 
and ecological systems, because it provides the capacity to absorb change 
without losing functions and self-organizing ability for repair, renewal, and 
reorganization after the change suffered.17  The rate at which biomass is 
produced depends on the diversity of plants in an ecosystem, because that 
diversity provides buffers against seasonal and other environmental 
changes.18  Continued crop productivity rests on the diversity in crop species 
and on the variety of soil invertebrates and microorganisms that maintain 
soil fertility.19, 20 
Healthy, functioning ecosystems provide several benefits that are 
essential to life support and welfare.  Life on Earth depends on the 
availability of goods and services provided by natural systems, and the 
phrase “natural capital” refers to a version of the economic concept of 
capital, extended to goods and services provided by those natural systems.21  
Natural capital provides all these benefits upon which humanity has relied 
and can be viewed “as the sum total of the ecological systems that support 
life, different from human-made capital in that natural capital cannot be 
produced by human activity.”22  In a broad perspective it means our natural 
resources, the four natural spheres and their physical, chemical, and 
biological processes.  Like traditional capital, natural capital can pay 
interest (the services and goods they provide), can depreciate (when the 
services delivered are impaired and goods reduced) or can be liquidated 
15. CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, ART. 2 USE OF TERMS (1992).
16. HAROLD A. MOONEY & PAUL R. EHRLICH, ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: A FRAGMENTARY
HISTORY IN NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 16-17 
(Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997). 
17. CARL FOLKE ET AL., RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: BUILDING 
ADAPTIVE CAPACITY IN A WORLD OF TRANSFORMATIONS (2002), in MALIN FALKENMARK, 
FRESHWATER AS SHARED BETWEEN SOCIETY AND ECOSYSTEMS: FROM DIVIDED APPROACHES TO
INTEGRATED CHALLENGES, 358 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B 2037, 2042 (2003). 
18. MICHAEL L. MCKINNEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE: SYSTEMS AND SOLUTIONS
82 (4th ed.  2007). 
19. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PERSPECTIVES ON BIODIVERSITY: VALUING ITS ROLE IN 
AN EVER-CHANGING WORLD 43 (1999). 
20. Diversity is of fundamental importance not only for traditional agriculture
but also provides a valuable resource in gene banks.  See Id. at 46. 
21. ROBERT COSTANZA ET AL, NATURAL CAPITAL in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH
(2008), available at http://www.eoearth.org/article/Natural_capital. 
22. PAUL HAWKEN ET AL., NATURAL CAPITALISM: CREATING THE NEXT INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION 151 (1999). 
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(when the resources are depleted and the services no longer exist).  As our 
understanding about the ecosystem dynamics is still in its infancy, their 
economic valuation presents additional challenges that will be explored in 
Part II.  Let us first analyze the services and goods provided by natural 
capital. 
B. Ecosystem Services
This rich and complex cycle of life provides several services and goods 
for which the relevant literature in its majority, but not uniformly, has 
established the phrase “ecosystem services.”23  The services delivered by 
ecosystems are essential for the maintenance of life on Earth and are key in 
human well-being and economic development.  The characteristics and 
maintenance of ecosystem services are linked to the diversity of species in 
the systems and ultimately to the genetic diversity within those species.24  
The recognition of the role played by ecosystems in life support dates 
from as early as Plato,25 were explored in George P. Marsh’s Man and Nature, 
and were highlighted in the first half of the twentieth century.26  In the 
second half of the twentieth century, the International Biological Program 
(“IBP”) started developing studies on the productivity of biological 
resources, human adaptability to environmental change, and environmental 
change itself.27  The studies firmly established ecosystems as an important 
unit of study.28  However, it was not until the publication of the Study of 
Critical Environmental Problems in 1970 that ecosystem services were so 
characterized, listed, and described.29  To the same extent ecosystem 
23. See infra note 27. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment adopts the
expression “ecosystem services” while some authors adopts the expression 
“environmental services.” However, as Wunder points out, for the purpose of 
analyzing the policy of Payment, the substantive difference is minimal.  SVEN 
WUNDER, CIFOR OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 42: PAYMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: SOME 
NUTS AND BOLTS 4 (2005). 
24. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra  note 19, at 51.
25. MOONEY & EHRLICH, supra note 16, at 6.
26. Highlighted by: Fairfield Osborn (1948), William Vogt (1948), and Aldo
Leopold (1949).  See MOONEY & EHRLICH, supra note 16, at 11–13. 
27. See THE INTERNATIONAL BIOLOGICAL PROGRAM, 1964–1974, available at
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/archives/International_Biological_Program.html. 
28. MOONEY & EHRLICH, supra note 16, at 14.
29. They were described as: pest control, insect pollination, fisheries, climate
regulation, soil retention, flood control, soil formation, cycling of matter, 
composition of the atmosphere, maintenance of soil fertility, and maintenance of a 
genetic library.  Id. at 14. 
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services were not recognized, they were not valuated.  The first attempt to 
assign numbers to the values ecosystem services was by Walter Westman 
in1977, followed by an article by Edward Farnworth  in 1981.30  By the 1990s, 
the discipline of ecological economics was well under way, led by Robert 
Costanza’s pioneering work.31  In the same decade, Gretchen Daily’s seminal 
book Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems awoke the 
general public to the role of ecosystems in delivering essential services to 
humanity.32 
Gretchen Daily defines ecosystem services as “the conditions and 
processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make 
them up, sustain and fulfill human life.”33  The intrinsic relationship between 
biotic organisms and their abiotic environment makes a change in the 
biogeochemical cycles or habitats, which necessarily affects the species in 
the system, and changes in species subsequently affect ecosystem 
processes.  Human consumption of ecosystem services necessarily affects 
the stock of natural capital necessary to support these same services. 
Population growth and excessively consumptive lifestyles are large drivers of 
ecosystem overexploitation, since more food, water, and raw materials are 
required to meet human needs.  This problem became particularly acute 
after the industrial revolution, when technology made possible extraction of 
natural resources and production using raw materials more efficiently and 
faster.  Irrigated crops, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides raised food 
production, which in turn allowed for a huge expansion in the world’s 
population.  All these factors led to a misperception that natural resources 
and the services they provide were free and unlimited.  In addition, the 
predominant policy was the allocation of natural resources exclusively for 
human needs so as to maximize the production of commodities.  This 
extreme anthropocentric view blinded us to the fact that the continuous 
delivery of these services depends on the maintenance of natural capital and 
the complex interactions between its elements.  If ecosystems are disturbed 
beyond a certain level, the services they provide will be affected and 
eventually lost. 
30. J.B. RUHL ET AL., supra note 11, at 6.
31. In 1997, Robert Costanza put a valuation on the world’s ecosystem services
at $33 trillion, 1.8 times the annual global GDP at the time.  Although the study was 
highly criticized for its flaws, it nevertheless called the world’s attention for the high 
value these services possess.  See Barton H. Thompson Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 261 (2000). 
32. DAILY, supra note 16.
33. DAILY, supra note 16, at 3.
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The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, initiated in 2001 and released 
in 2005, introduced the concept of ecosystem services into the policy 
debate34. This report was a comprehensive study to “assess the 
consequences of ecosystem change for human well-being and the scientific 
basis for actions needed to enhance the conservation and sustainable use of 
those systems and their contribution to human well-being.”35  It was 
conducted under the auspices of the United Nations in cooperation with 
representatives of international institutions, governments, business, non-
governmental organization (“NGOs”), and indigenous peoples.36  The scope 
of work was designed to meet the demands of four international 
agreements, namely the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the Ramsar Convention on 
Wetlands, and the Convention on Migratory Species, along with other 
ecosystem beneficiaries such as the business and health sector, 
nongovernmental organizations, and indigenous peoples.37  The outcome 
was the Synthesis Report and five additional detailed reports designed to 
meet the needs of its own audience: the Biodiversity Synthesis (Convention 
on Biological Diversity (“CBD”)); the Desertification Synthesis (United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification); Wetlands & Water (the 
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands); Opportunities & Challenges for Business 
& Industry (business and industry sector) and Health Synthesis (health 
sector).38 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment describes ecosystem services 
as the benefits people obtain from ecosystems,39 and these benefits are 
classified in four categories: i) Provisioning; ii) Regulating, iii) Cultural, and 
iv) Supporting services; 40
34. Erik Gómez-Baggethun et al., The History of Ecosystem Services in Economic
Theory and Practice: From Early Notions to Markets and Payments Schemes, Ecological Economics 
69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1209 (2009).  
35. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING:
SYNTHESIS ii (2005). 
36. Id.
37. Id. at v.
38. See OVERVIEW OF REPORTS, http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/
Reports.aspx (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
39. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 35, at 53.
40. Id. at 40.
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TABLE 1: 
Categories of Ecosystem Services 
Category Type of Service 
Provisioning 
Services – The 
products obtained 
from ecosystems. 
Food.  The vast range of food products derived from plants, 
animals, and microbes. 
Fiber.  Materials included here are wood, jute, cotton, hemp, 
silk, and wool. 
Fuel.  Wood, dung, and other biological materials serve as 
sources of energy. 
Genetic resources . The genes and genetic information used for 
animal and plant breeding and biotechnology. 
Biochemicals, natural medicines and pharmaceuticals.  Many 
medicines, biocides, food additives such as alginates, and 
biological materials are derived from ecosystems. 
Ornamental resources.  Animal and plant products such as 
skins, shells, and flowers are used as ornaments.  Whole 
plants are used for landscaping and ornaments. 
Fresh water.  People obtain fresh water from ecosystems, thus 
the supply of fresh water can be considered a provisioning 
service.  Fresh water in rivers is also a source of energy.  
However, because water is required for other life to exist, it 







Air quality regulation.  Ecosystems both contribute chemicals 
to and extract chemicals from the atmosphere, influencing 
many aspects of air quality. 
Climate regulation.  Ecosystems influence climate both locally 
and globally.  At a local scale, for example, changes in land 
cover can affect both temperature and precipitation.  At the 
global scale, ecosystems play an important role in climate by 
either sequestering or emitting greenhouse gases. 
Water regulation.  The timing and magnitude of runoff, 
flooding, and aquifer recharge can be strongly influenced by 
changes in land cover, including, in particular, alterations 
that change the water storage potential of the system, such 
as the conversion of wetlands or the replacement of forests 
with croplands or croplands with urban areas. 
Erosion regulation.  Vegetative cover plays an important role in 
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soil retention and the prevention of landslides. 
Water purification and waste treatment.  Ecosystems can be a 
source of impurities (for instance, in fresh water) but also 
can help filter out and decompose organic wastes introduced 
into inland waters and coastal and marine ecosystems.  They 
assimilate and detoxify compounds through soil and subsoil 
processes. 
Disease regulation.  Changes in ecosystems can directly change 
the abundance of human pathogens, such as cholera, and 
can alter the abundance of disease vectors, such as 
mosquitoes. 
Pest regulation.  Ecosystem changes affect the prevalence of 
crop and livestock pests and diseases. 
Pollination.  Ecosystem changes affect the distribution, 
abundance, and effectiveness of pollinators. 
Natural hazard regulation.  The presence of coastal ecosystems 
such as mangroves and coral reefs can reduce the damage 
caused by hurricanes or large waves. 













Cultural diversity.  The diversity of ecosystems is one factor 
influencing the diversity of cultures. 
Spiritual and religious values.  Many religions attach spiritual 
and religious values to ecosystems or their components. 
Knowledge systems.  Ecosystems influence the types of 
knowledge systems developed by different cultures. 
Educational values. Ecosystems, their components, and their 
processes provide the basis for both formal and informal 
education in many societies. 
Inspiration.  Ecosystems provide a rich source of inspiration 
for art, folklore, national symbols, architecture, and 
advertising. 
Aesthetic values.  Many people find beauty or aesthetic value in 
various aspects of ecosystems, as reflected in the support for 
parks, scenic drives, and the selection of housing locations. 
Social relations. Ecosystems influence the types of social 
relations that are established in particular cultures.  Fishing 
societies, for example, differ in many respects in their social 
relations from nomadic herding or agricultural societies. 
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Sense of place.  Many people value the “sense of place” that is 
associated with recognized features of their environment, 
including aspects of the ecosystem. 
Cultural heritage values.  Many societies place high value on the 
maintenance of either historically important landscapes  or 
culturally significant species. 
Recreation and ecotourism. People often choose where to spend 
their leisure time based in part on the characteristics of the 
natural or cultivated landscapes in a particular area. 
Supporting Service 








on people are often
indirect or occur








Soil Formation.  Because many provisioning services depend 
on soil fertility, the rate of soil formation influences human 
well-being in many ways. 
Photosynthesis.  Photosynthesis produces oxygen necessary for 
most living organisms. 
Primary production.  The assimilation or accumulation of 
energy and nutrients by organisms. 
Nutrient cycling.  Approximately 20 nutrients essential to life, 
including nitrogen and phosphorus, cycle through 
ecosystems and are maintained at different concentrations 
in different parts of ecosystems. 
Water cycling.  Water cycles through ecosystems and is 
essential for living organisms.   
Source: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: 
Synthesis (2005) at 40, Box 2.1. 
The above definition encompasses ecosystem goods or commodities, 
ecosystem structures and functions within the definition of ecosystem 
services.41  Ecosystem goods such as food, fisheries, fibers, fuel, water, and 
many other end products are easily recognized because they provide direct 
benefit to humans and are traded in the marketplace.  However, “ecosystem 
41. Id. at 56.
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structures” support the basic “functions” that sustain life and make possible 
the production of ecosystem goods.42  Ecosystem structures refer to “the 
composition of ecosystem (i.e., its various parts) and the physical and 
biological organization defining how those parts are organized.”43  
Ecosystem functions “[describe] . . . a process that takes place in an 
ecosystem as a result of the interactions of plants, animals, and other 
(micro) organisms in the ecosystem with each other or their environment 
and that serves some purpose.”44  The Economics of Ecosystems & 
Biodiversity Report characterizes ecosystem services as “the direct and 
indirect contributions of ecosystems to human well-being.”45  
James Boyd and Spencer Banzhaf, however, adopt a stricter definition 
of ecosystem services.  For these authors, ecosystem services are 
“components of nature, directly enjoyed, consumed, or used to yield human 
well-being.”46  The authors draw a distinction between components, 
functions or processes, and benefits.  Components include resources such 
as water, oceans, vegetation types, and species; they are end products of 
nature.  Ecosystem processes and functions are the biological, chemical, 
and physical interactions between ecosystem components and are not end 
products but intermediates to the production of these end products.47  
Benefits are the joint use of ecosystem services and conventional goods and 
services.48  Once an ecosystem service adds non-ecological inputs like 
human labor and financial capital to obtain a particular service like 
commercial harvests, they cannot be considered ecosystem services.49  These 
authors propose that the value of ecosystem services should be captured in 
the measurement of services in order to avoid double counting.50  “Our 
insistence on the distinction between intermediate ecological processes and 
final services may seem like a quibble.  From the standpoint of practical 
42. Barton H. Thompson, Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital: Reconceiving
Environmental Management, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 460, 465 (2008). 
43. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: TOWARD BETTER 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 60 (2004). 
44. Id.
45. THE ECONOMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS AND BIODIVERSITY, MAINSTREAMING THE
ECONOMICS OF NATURE: A SYNTHESIS OF THE APPROACH, CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF TEEB 3 (2010). 
46. JAMES BOYD & SPENCER BANZHAF, WHAT ARE ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: THE NEED FOR
STANDARDIZED ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING UNITS 8 (2006). 
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id. at 9.
49. Id. at 23.
50. Id. at 9.
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measurement, however, it is not.  Measuring processes is much more 
difficult than measuring the outcomes of processes.”51  Although the 
distinction between functions, services, and benefits is important, especially 
for economic valuation, it often is not possible to make a fully consistent 
classification, especially for regulating services, and there is no consensus 
among the experts on the taxonomy.52  Nevertheless, for the purpose of this 
paper, we will refer to ecosystem structure, function, services, and goods as 
“ecosystem services” that can be either a final or an intermediary service. 
The unique feature presented by ecosystem services is that they are 
not like other goods or services that move throughout our economy.  They 
cannot be selected for rate, location or combination,53 and in most cases, 
they cannot be separated from their physical setting.  They are ecologically, 
geographically, and economically much more complex than any other kind 
of commodity or service traded in the marketplace.54  In addition, the 
complexity is not limited to the interactions and synergies between humans 
and ecosystems; rather, it also encompasses the relationship between 
different ecosystems, in different levels and scales.  Changes in one 
provisioning service may affect other regulating or supporting services, and 
our knowledge in this regard is still in its infancy.55  As an example, “species 
that stray outside of their natural habitats can have deadly consequences for 
people and biodiversity alike.”56  Our partial knowledge on the interactions 
between ecosystem structures and functions and the extent to which they 
provide ecosystem services make the task of accessing and measuring them 
daunting.  Although mapping ecosystem services does not proceed linearly 
from ecosystem structure,57 the effort of continuous study is worth it in order 
to obtain a more sustainable use of our natural capital and continued well-
being of both present and future generations.58 
51. Id. at 16.
52. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 43, at 77.
53. J.B. RUHL ET AL., supra note 11, at 32.
54. Id. at 13.
55. Id. at 35.
56. NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 6, at 31.
57. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 43, at 77.
58. While Professor B. H. Thompson is pleased with the progress made by the
Natural Capital Project (See THOMPSON, supra note 42, at 473), R. B. Norgaard argues 
the stock-flow framework adopted is insufficient for the complexities involved and 
might blind us to the necessary major institutional changes that are required. See 
Richard B. Norgaard, Ecosystem Services: From Eye-opening Metaphor to Complexity Blinder, 
69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1219 (2010). 
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A simple look at the above list of services provided in Table 1 
demonstrates our dependency on functioning ecosystems.  In the early1990s 
an initiative called “Biosphere 2” tried to reproduce all natural conditions 
within a sealed and artificial ecological system.  It aimed to reproduce many 
of the functioning ecosystems found on Earth.  The first group of scientists 
entered the structure in 1991 and the last group in 199459 when the sponsors 
decided to shut down the project.  During those three years the ecosystems 
collapsed and ceased providing services.  Aquatic systems accumulated 
excess nutrients, natural pest control failed since all pollinators were 
extinct, along with most vertebrate species.  At the same time, ants and 
cockroaches flourished.  Oxygen concentrations in the atmosphere dropped 
and nitrous oxide spiked upward dramatically.  Carbon dioxide fluctuated 
erratically.60 
As the Biosphere 2 project demonstrated, mankind has not yet been 
able to engineer technological substitutes for the services that nature 
delivers “for free” and in the very few cases where humans were able to 
design and implement a reasonable facsimile — as in the case of water 
filtration, for example — it proved to be far too expensive.61  Much research 
is still needed to understand how such complex systems work and as 
Professor Ruhl et al. point out “knowing how ecosystem services operate 
ecologically will not guarantee sound economic and policy decisions about 
the environment, but not knowing . . . will guarantee unsound economic and 
policy decisions.”62 
These and many other challenges, along with the alarming rate at 
which ecosystems and biodiversity have been degraded in the past decades, 
led the international community to agree to establish the Intergovernmental 
Science-Policy Platform for Biodiversity and Ecosystem services (“IPBES”) in 
the 3rd UNEP facilitated meeting held in South Korea in June 2010.63  The 
IPBES parallels what the IPCC represents for climate change and was 
established with the goal of strengthening the dialogue between science and 
59. BIOSPHERE 2, http://www.b2science.org/PDF/b2timeline.pdf (last visited Dec.
16, 2010). 
60. Geoffrey Heal et al., Protecting Natural Capital Through Ecosystem Service Districts,
20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 338-39 (2001). 
61. See Table 3: The NYC Watershed Agreement.
62. J. B. RUHL ET AL., supra note 11, at 35.
63. Intergovernmental Meeting,  United Nations Environment Programme:
Busan Outcome, (June 11, 2010), http://www.ipbes.net/meetings/Documents/ipbes3/ 
K1030396-IPBES-3-L.2Rev1.pdf  
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policy and to help building a uniform and consistent framework for 
addressing biodiversity and ecosystem services challenges.64 
C. Freshwater Ecosystems
1. Water Resources and Freshwater Ecosystems
The hydrosphere covers approximately seventy percent of the world’s 
surface, and water is found in three phases: liquid, solid and gas.  Nearly 
97.5 percent of the world’s surface  is saltwater  with fresh water comprising 
only 2.5 percent of the amount of water resources.65 
FIGURE 1: 
Global Distribution of Water Resources* 
64. IPBES, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW, available at http://www.ipbes.net/images/
stories/documents/whatyouneedtoknow_ipbes.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
65. UNESCO-WWAP, WATER: A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, THE UNITED NATIONS 
WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2, 121 (2006), available at http://unesdoc.unesco. 
org/images/0014/001454/145405E.pdf. 
* UNESCO-WWAP, WATER: A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD 
WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2, 121 Figure 4.1 (2006). 
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 Water cycles throughout the spheres driven by solar energy and 
gravity, and this hydrological cycle provides the supply of renewable fresh 
water for nature and humans.  Water forms the snowpack and provides 
critical water flow to support regions such as the Andes and the Himalayas, 
where the ice cap and glaciers partially melt during spring and summer. 
Water evaporates from oceans and surface water bodies, and transpires from 
plants to the atmosphere where it condensates and precipitates over the 
oceans, rivers, lakes, land, and wetlands. Approximately forty percent of the 
precipitation that falls on land comes from ocean-derived vapor.  The 
remaining sixty percent comes from land-based sources.66  After 
precipitating, water infiltrates the soil and is absorbed by plants or 
replenishes aquifers, providing most of our renewable freshwater supply. 
The rate of renewal may vary significantly.  Water in the atmosphere is 
renewed every eight days and takes about sixteen days to recycle water in 
streams and rivers.67  The renewal period of glaciers, ground water, large 
lakes and the oceans vary from hundreds to thousands of years.68  
However, water is also a nonrenewable resource.  Water is considered 
a nonrenewable a resource by virtue of the fact that the finite supply of 
freshwater is routinely consumed at a faster rate than it can be recharged.69  
Groundwater plays a critical role feeding springs and streams, supporting 
wetlands70 and maintaining stability in areas of unstable ground.  It still 
serves as a source of water supply for human needs in many regions 
throughout the globe and withdrawal in these areas are one of the main 
pressures that water faces currently.  Because these aquifers have a 
negligible rate of recharge on the human time scale they are considered 
nonrenewable resources and even small amounts of groundwater withdrawal 
make its extraction unsustainable. 
66. Id. at 123.
67. IGOR A. SHIKLOMANOV, WORLD FRESH WATER RESOURCES, IN WATER IN CRISIS: A 
GUIDE TO THE WORLD’S FRESH WATER RESOURCES 15 (Peter H. Gleick ed., 1993). 
68. Id. at 15.
69. MEENA PALANIAPPAN & PETER H. GLEICK, THE PEAK WATER, in GLEIK ET AL., THE
WORLD’S WATER 2008-2009: THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 1, 4 (Peter 
H. Gleick ed., 2009).
70. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS, VOLUME 1,
supra note 2, 557 (2005). 
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When computing water resources hydrologists usually don’t compute 
what is called “green water” rather they compute only “blue water.”71  In 
simple terms, blue water is the water that precipitates and flows in rivers, 
lakes and is stored in aquifers.72  Green water is the invisible flow of water 
that transpirates and evaporates into the atmosphere.73  Because this water 
is no longer available for local withdrawal and is hard to track in the 
hydrological cycle, it is considered a loss.  The evaporation from plants is 
called “productive green water” because it indicates production of biomass 
through photosynthesis as compared with the purely physical and 
uncontrolled evaporation from surface waters, which is called “unproductive 
green water.”74  Terrestrial ecosystems are “green water” dependants,75 and 
despite aquatic ecosystems being mostly blue water dependants, the quality 
and flow of blue water depends also on the green water cycle. 
Although all ecosystems are water dependant, ecologists tend to 
classify aquatic ecosystems as those where there is a “dominance of water in 
the internal structure and functions of an area.”76  As a result, these systems 
might include streams, rivers, ponds, lakes, estuaries, wetlands, and 
groundwater, and cannot be analyzed without considering the linkages to 
adjacent terrestrial environments.77  The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
identifies freshwater ecosystems as inland water systems. Freswater 
ecosystems are defined as “permanent water bodies inland from the coastal 
zone and areas whose properties and use are dominated by the permanent, 
seasonal, or intermittent occurrence of flooded conditions,” while  inland 
waters include “rivers, lakes, floodplains, reservoirs, wetlands, and inland 
71. FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WATER REPORTS: REVIEW OF
WORLD WATER RESOURCES BY COUNTRY 23, 8 (2003) available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/ 
fao/005/y4473E/y4473e02.pdf. 
72. FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WATER REPORTS: REVIEW OF
WORLD WATER RESOURCES BY COUNTRY 23, 8 Box 2 (2003) available at ftp://ftp. 
fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y4473E/y4473e02.pdf. 
73. WOLFRAM MAUSER, WATER RESOURCES: EFFICIENT, SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE 
USE 29 (Karen Schneider trans., Haus Publishing 2009). 
74. Id. at 29-31.
75. ANIL AGARWAL ET AL., INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 24 (Global
Water Partnership, 2000), available at http://waterwiki.net/images/6/62/GWPbackground 
IWRMpaper.pdf. 
76. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 59.
77. Id.
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saline systems.”78  They encompass an area of 10.3 million square feet; the 
equivalent of seven percent of the terrestrial surface of Earth.79  
2. Freshwater Ecosystem Services
Water is among one of our most precious natural resources.  Due to its 
unique molecular properties, water is the major component of most cells 
and living tissues, and is vital to the transport of nutrients throughout the 
biosphere.  Water is the best-known natural solvent and has exceptionally 
high melting and boiling points.80  The large amount of heat that is stored in 
the water molecule provides benefits ranging from climate regulation to 
machinery cooling.81  In its liquid state water creates the so-called “third 
equilibrium,” which is a stage of physical equilibrium characterized by a 
close interaction between the carbon and the water cycle via vegetation, 
regulating the amount of oxygen and greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, 
and maintaining conditions suitable for life.82  Photosynthesis depends on 
water and carbon dioxide to produce sugar and oxygen, producing biomass, 
and supporting the whole food chain.  Biological processes also depend on 
water to receive dissolved nutrients from chemical processes involved in the 
weathering of rocks and nutrient runoff.  Water has been essential for the 
maintenance and operation of Earth’s life support system for the past 2.7 
billion years.83   
In the international arena, the dimension of the role played by water 
resources in life-supporting systems and the significance of managing these 
resources in an “integrated” manner was defined in 1992 during the 
International Conference on Water and the Environment (“ICWE”) held in 
Dublin.84  This was the last technical preparatory meeting before the U.N. 
Conference on Environment and Development (known as the “Earth 
Summit“) and resulted in the Dublin Statement, which embodies the four 
Dublin guiding principles: 
Principle 1: Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, 
essential to sustain life, development and the environment. 
78. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 35, at 30.
79. Id. at 31.
80. MCKINNEY ET. AL, supra note 18, at 243.
81. MAUSER, supra note 74, at 8-10.
82. Id. at 13-18.
83. Id. at 18.
84. THE DUBLIN STATEMENT ON WATER AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, available at
http://www.gdrc.org/uem/water/dublin-statement.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
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Principle 2: Water development and management should be 
based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and 
policy-makers at all levels. 
Principle 3: Women play a central part in the provision, 
management and safeguarding of water. 
Principle 4: Water has an economic value in all its competing 
uses and should be recognized as an economic good.85  
When water is available in both quantity and quality freshwater 
ecosystems deliver a number of services essential to the support of human 
life and well-being.  However, human use of freshwater ecosystems  often 
conflicts.  As Principle 1 stresses, an effective management of water 
resources demands a holistic approach, linking social and economic 
development with protection of natural ecosystems.86  
a. Domestic Use
The most basic human need is drinking water; followed by water to 
grow and cook food.  Water is necessary for washing, cleaning, and 
sanitation.  To survive, humans need an average of 3.75 liters or one gallon 
of water per day for biological needs.87  Considering the water required for 
personal hygiene, washing, sanitary, and sewage purposes, the flow required 
for healthy living conditions averages between twenty to forty liters per 
person a day.88  However, domestic consumption varies greatly throughout 
the world.  In the United States domestic water use average per year is 203 
m3/p (cubic meters per person)89 while in Nigeria it accounts for 13 m3/p, in 
Brazil it is estimated to be 65 m3/p, in Germany it is 57m3/p and in China, 27 
m3/p.90  Although domestic use should reflect numbers that are close to the 
85. THE DUBLIN STATEMENT ON WATER AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, available at
http://www.gdrc.org/uem/water/dublin-statement.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
86. MAUSER, supra note 74, at 68.
87. MCKINNEY ET. AL, supra note 18, at 245.
88. MAUSER, supra note 74, at 118.
89. Each cubic meter is equal to 1,000 liters.
90. Data from 2000 and 2001. See GLEIK ET AL., supra note 67, at 22 Data Table 2.
Fresh Water Withdrawal by Country and Sector. The use of water varies greatly from 
country to country and from region to region. For an updated and comprehensive 
assessment of water consumption the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) maintains a database called AQUASTAT with consistent 
information. See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (“FAO”),
AQUASTAT, available at http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm (last visited 
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average required for basic human needs, the disparities between countries 
demonstrated above illustrates how local water availability and lifestyles 
affect this minimum domestic consumption. 
On a global scale there are enough water resources and technologies 
to meet basic human needs.  Nevertheless, the number of people in the 
world without access to safe drinking water and sanitation compelled the 
United Nations to sponsor a summit in 2000 that led to the adoption of the 
U.N. Millennium Declaration,91 urging nations to implement measures to 
reduce extreme poverty, hunger, and disease by 2015 through 
implementation of the Millennium Development Goals.  Target three of the 
Seventh Millennium Development Goal aims to “halve, by 2015, the 
proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and 
basic sanitation.”92  Water plays a key role in poverty alleviation because it 
protects and improves health, is essential for food security, and strongly 
contributes to economic development.  Safe drinking water and sanitation 
have already proved to be one of the most efficient ways of improving 
human health, simply by providing the means for people to avoid water 
borne diseases.93  Furthermore, access to water and sanitation improves the 
level of education of women, particularly in Africa, since it negates the need 
for them to spend hours fetching water, and means that they don’t have to 
miss classes due to lack of appropriate sanitation.94  The world as a whole is 
likely to meet the target of halving the proportion of population without 
access to safe drinking water,95 but is not likely to meet the target regarding 
access to improved sanitation facilities.96  The eight Millennium 
Development Goals are a good example of the role played by water in 
sustaining life and achieving welfare, since meeting the MDG for water and 
Dec. 16, 2010).  A caveat must be made, however, since data comes from a variety of 
sources and some are effectively measured and some are only estimated.  Data also 
come from different years making direct comparison difficult.  See GLEICK ET AL., supra 
note 67, at 202. 
91. G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
92. U.N. Millennium Development Goals Home Page, available online at
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
93. UNESCO-WWAP, supra note 63, at 88.
94. Id.
95. With the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, Oceania, and the Asian
countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States that still fall behind the 2015 
target for drinking water access.  See GLEIK ET AL., supra note 67, at 65. 
96. Millennium Development Goal 7 Fact Sheet, available online at http://
www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2008highlevel/pdf/newsroom/Goal%207%20FINAL.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
 
West  Northwest, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 2012 
213 
sanitation provides the foundation for and is critical to achieving all of the 
other development goals.97  However, lack of adequate institutions and 
infrastructure in many places in the world still prevents us from reaching the 
sanitation goals and improving safe drinking water numbers.  In poor areas, 
captured fish and agriculture is the main source of income and livelihood. 
Other sources of income usually derive from handicrafts that also depend 
upon water directly or indirectly such as brick making, basket making, textile 
weaving, and beer brewing.98  Water is critical for food production, especially 
during critical crop-growing seasons.  Studies demonstrate that a boost in 
agriculture production is the first step toward achieving economic 
development and shifting from agriculture-based into industrialized-based 
economies.99 
b. Agriculture
Water resources are essential to food production.  In simple terms, 
water is one of the elements that make photosynthesis occur, thus 
supporting the whole food chain.  Worldwide, sixty-nine percent of water 
resources are used by agriculture,100 as irrigation is the primary consumer of 
water on earth101 and also the activity that wastes the most.102  With irrigated 
agriculture, a huge amount of water is simply wasted due to inefficient 
irrigation systems.103  Even when run-off returns to the streams, it is usually 
degraded by fertilizers, pesticides, and salts.104  What has made possible the 
population’s exponential growth in the last ninety years was irrigated 
agriculture.105  However the large amount of withdrawals that irrigated 
agriculture requires and the inefficiency of the method pose severe threats 
to the resource, limiting further expansion and even threatening current 
production in areas that already face water scarcity. 
Under the hydrologists point of view, however, even more efficient 
methods of irrigation do not ensure more water efficiency, because more 
water is lost by a larger area of transpiration. The situation is particularly 
97. GLEIK ET AL., supra note 67, at 73.
98. UNESCO-WWAP, supra note 63, at 86.
99. Id. at 81-82.
100. Data of 1990.  See SHIKLOMANOV, supra note 65, at 20.
101. Id. at 19.
102. MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 242.
103. Id. at 246.
104. Sandra Postel, Water and Agriculture in WATER IN CRISIS 57 (1993).
105. Id.
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problematic in arid regions and with water-intensive crops.  Each crop 
requires a certain amount of water to build biomass that is absorbed by its 
roots, and some crops are highly water demanding when compared to 
others.  As an example, the global average volume of water required to grow 
one apple is seventy liters while 1,300 liters are required to produce one 
kilogram of wheat.106  Similarly, 15,500 liters is the minimum amount of 
water necessary to produce one kilogram of beef.107  The large disparity 
between water required to produce crops and animal products is due to the 
fact that animals feed mostly on crops to produce biomass and only about 
ten percent of this energy goes into the meat.108  In addition, even assuming 
an efficient irrigation system, not all biomass produced by plants are 
consumed by humans, and leftovers such as stalks, thorns, and leaves 
correspond to approximately two-thirds of the total biomass produced.109  As 
a result, simply put, crops need three units of water to produce one unit of 
food.   
The role water plays in the production of biofuels must also be 
considered.  Bioenergy can be produced from corn and other grains, sugar 
cane, beets, organic oil, cellulose and organic wastes.110  Used as an 
alternative to fossil fuels, the production of biodiesel tripled between 2000 
and 2007 to an estimated 77 billion liters in 2008.111  However, as with any 
other crop, production of biodiesel requires large amounts of water 
withdrawals in irrigated areas and recently has raised concerns about 
inflating the price of food commodities and causing increased deforestation. 
In addition, “[a]mong current technologies only ethanol produced from 
sugarcane, ethanol produced as a by-product of cellulose production and 
biodiesel produced from animal fats and used cooking oil can substantially 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions compared with gasoline and mineral 
diesel.”112 
106. Product Water Footprints, http://www.waterfootprint.org/?page=files/
productgallery  (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
107. Id. These examples are illustrative, and calculating the water footprint
depends on several factors such as the place and period of production, water use 
efficiency methods and the accounting methodology. 
108. MAUSER, supra note 74, at 130.
109. MAUSER, supra note 69, at 128-129.
110. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS, VOLUME 1,
supra note 2, at 110. 
111. Id.
112. Id. at 111.
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c. Fisheries and Aquaculture
Freshwater ecosystems also support fisheries and aquaculture, 
providing eleven percent of global fish consumption in 2006.113  Inland 
fisheries contribute to local economic development and poverty alleviation. 
In some regions, this is the only source of daily animal protein intake for the 
population.  The aquaculture industry has been growing at an average rate 
of 8.9 percent per year since 1970,114 and along with fish capture is an 
important source of export revenue as well as direct and indirect 
employment.115  However, when not designed and managed properly, 
aquaculture has contributed to habitat degradation, pollution, spread of 
diseases, and introduction of invasive species; all of which increase the 
pressure on freshwater ecosystems.116 
d. Industrial Use
The second largest user of water resources is the industrial sector, 
which withdraws an average of 23.6 percent.117  Industrial production is 
dependent upon water in many ways.  Water resources are used to generate 
electricity  and to cool thermoelectric generation processes like nuclear, 
coal-fired, natural gas power plants, and even solar thermal plants.118  Water 
is also used in petroleum refineries, chemical processing, natural gas 
processing, food processing, semiconductor plants, as well as the 
production of metal, cement, paper and cellulose.  In addition, water is used 
to remove industrial wastes.  “Probably every manufactured product uses 
water during some part of the production process,” but “[s]ome industries 
113. Id. at 122.
114. WATER IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 2, at 571.
115. UNESCO-WWAP, supra note 2, at 121-122.
116. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra note 35, at 572.
117. Shiklomanov, supra note 64, at 20.
118. Typically, thermoelectric generators are used for cooling water because
they are more efficient and economic, but in areas of water scarcity these can no 
longer be the alternative. The limiting factor is not the cost of water itself but its 
availability. Wet-cooling systems consume much less water than once-through 
cooling systems, yet it is more expensive and consumes more energy.  However, 
when taking into account the environmental effects of once-through cooling system, 
it falls out of favor. Photovoltaic solar plants don’t consume water to generate power 
but the steel that goes into power plants does.  Erica Gies, “Water Adds New 
Constraints to Power,” N.Y. Times, May 17, 2010 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/business/energy-environment/18iht-rencal.html? 
scp=1&sq=solar%20power%20plants%20cooling&st=cse (Last visited on Dec. 16, 
2010). 
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that use large amounts of water produce such commodities as food, paper, 
chemicals, refined petroleum, or primary metals.”119 
The practice of using “grey water” has been increasing, largely in 
Australia.120  Grey water, also called recycled or reclaimed water, is the 
wastewater that is recycled and reused for industrial cooling, washing, boiler 
feed, transport and separation, and some process uses after some kind of 
treatment.121   
e. Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology
Aquatic ecosystems may also contribute as sources of pharmaceutical 
products.  Plant and animal-based remedies constitute an integral part of 
traditional medicine in both rural and urban areas in many countries 
throughout the world.  According to a new study published in Tropical 
Conservation Science, a surprising number of invertebrates are used in 
Brazilian traditional medicines.  Researchers discovered that at least eighty-
one species from five taxonomic groups, among them some estuarine 
species, are being used to treat a variety of illnesses.122  Biodiversity is also 
the essential “raw material” for the biotechnology industry.  As an example, 
a thermophilic bacterium collected from the hot springs at Yellowstone 
National Park provided the heat-stable enzyme Taq Polymerase, which made 
possible medical diagnoses, forensic analyses, and basic research that was 
impossible just ten years ago.123 
f. Instream Uses
Finally, freshwater ecosystems also support instream uses that are not 
reflected in statistic water uses because such uses cannot be measured in 
119. United States Geological Survey, Industrial Water Use, http://ga.water.
usgs.gov/edu/wuin.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
120. INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABILITY AND INNOVATION AT VICTORIA UNIVERSITY, GUIDANCE 
FOR THE USE OF RECYCLED WATER BY INDUSTRY (2008), available at http://www. 
smartwater.com.au/projects/round4/vicuni/Documents/VicUni_LiteratureReview_Rec
ycledWaterUseForIndustry.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
121. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, WATER RECYCLING AND REUSE: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS,available at http://www.epa.gov/region9/water/recycling 
/brochure.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
122. Rômulo R. N. Alves & Thelma. L. P. Dias, Usos de invertebrados na medicina
popular no Brasil e suas implicações para conservação, 3 TROPICAL CONSERVATION SCI. 159 
(2010), available at http://tropicalconservationscience.mongabay.com/content/v3/10-
06-28_159-174_Alves&Dias.pdf.
123. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 50.
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volume terms.124  These non-extractive uses can be classified as 
transportation, cultural, recreational, aesthetic, and ecosystem needs. 
Freshwater ecosystems have served for many centuries as waterways 
for transportation of goods and mail.  River navigation was part of the Indus 
Valley Civilization in Northwest India around 3300 BCE and remains an 
important activity in many of the major rivers in the world.125  Nevertheless, 
inland shipping remains an underdeveloped sector on most waterways 
despite its cost-effectiveness and despite being the least polluting means of 
transportation.126 
Since the beginning of humanity, nature has been a source of 
inspiration, aesthetic beauty, and spiritual relief, albeit these cultural 
services may be perceived, experienced and valued differently by different 
cultures.  This appreciation is well demonstrated in our cultures, religions, 
artistic expressions and architectures.  People across cultures and different 
regions demonstrate, in general, an aesthetic preference for natural over 
urban or built environments.127  The very contemplation of a lake or river is a 
source of vast pleasure and peace for many.  “The most common element of 
all religions throughout history has been the inspiration they have drawn 
from nature.  . . . The idea of “unity” between humans and nature is present 
in all major religions and influences the management of ecosystems and our 
attitude toward species.  The concept of Sarvabhutadaya in Buddhism implies 
that humans are an integral part of the ecosystem, with a sense of 
compassion and fellowship — that we give back what we have taken from 
the biosphere.  In the Bible and the Koran, reference is made to the 
importance of nature as a source of life for humans and their fellow-
creatures.”128  “Traditional societies all over the world have institutionalized 
sacred landscapes and ecosystems in a variety of ways, large and small, as 
part of their belief systems.”129  Hindu, Judaic, Christian, and Islamic 
traditions stress the symbolism of water in spiritual purification.130  Lake 
Titicaca in Bolivia was the holy place of all ancient Andean cultures and the 
124. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 100.
125. Id. at 120.
126. Id. at 121.
127. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 35, at 120.
128. Id. at 463.
129. Id.
130. PETER G. BROWN AND JEREMY J. SCHMIDT, WATER ETHICS: FOUNDATIONAL
READINGS FOR STUDENTS AND PROFESSIONALS 48 (Island Press 2010). 
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source of a hundred cosmogenic myths.131  In some societies, ecosystems 
also provide the basis for formal and informal education132 and influence the 
types of social relations that are established in particular cultures.133  The 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment reported that “spiritual and cultural 
values of ecosystems were as important as other services for many local 
communities, both in developing countries . . . and industrial ones.”134 
Recreation and ecotourism is a source of not only aesthetic pleasure 
and well-being but also huge revenues.  Due to an increase in environmental 
awareness, economic conditions and appropriate infrastructure, ecotourism 
has grown substantially in the past twenty-five years.  Recreation and 
tourism have different values for people in developed countries and for 
people in developing countries — in the United States it represents a very 
important industry while in developing countries it is now the primary 
economic development strategy.135  Freshwater recreational uses fit in 
several categories, such as swimming, boating, sports fishing, kayaking, 
canoeing, and rafting.136  In the United States these activities achieved such 
an importance that land which was previously dedicated to commodity 
extraction has now been protected by federal public land management 
agencies specifically to preserve and encourage such activites.137  The 
emergence of recreation and tourism as a dominant use generated several 
conflicts with other users.138  The Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Act is an 
attempt to reconcile growing and competing interests in the use of natural 
“renewable and non-renewable surface resources” such as outdoor 
recreation, range, timbers, minerals, watershed, wildlife, fish, natural scenic, 
scientific, and historical values.139  Despite the noble purpose of the act, 
131. MARTIN GRAY, OCEAN, LAKE, RIVER AND SPRING: SACRED WATERS, MYTH AND
TRANSFORMATION, available at http://www.sacredsites.com/martin_gray/documents/ 
sacred_waters.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
132. Educational services of ecosystems assessed in Sweden, Brazil, and
Portugal are all increasing due to growing levels of awareness of the value and 
benefits of, and thus the demand for, environmental education.  See MILLENNIUM 
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 35, at 120. 
133. Id. at 40.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. SANDRA POSTEL & STEPHEN CARPENTER, FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, in
NATURE’S SERVICES 195, 202 (G. C. Daily ed. 1997). 
137. ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
AND SOCIETY 1198 (3rd ed. 2003). 
138. Id.
139. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (West 2010).
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administrators struggle to  balance and accommodate such different uses in 
a sustained yield. 
Among all users of water resources Nature is probably the most 
important because it makes possible not only the delivery of all services 
already mentioned, but also provides structures and processes that make 
possible their delivery, sustaining human, animal and plant life and 
habitats.  Healthy aquatic ecosystems depend on water quality, flow and 
adequate temperature so as to maintain their capacity to provide services. 
Once these needs are met, they provide several services such as climate and 
hydrological regulation; nutrient distribution and primary production; 
sheltering, breeding and habitat for many species; waste dilution and 
detoxification, prevention from soil erosion and siltation, and a buffer 
against natural hazards. 
Worldwide, over twelve percent of all wildlife species live in freshwater 
ecosystems, and many others depend on these ecosystems for their 
survival.140  Freshwater aquatic species include forty-one percent of the 
world’s known fish and most of the world’s endangered fish species.141  
Seasonal flooding provides habitat for many aquatic species to spawn, 
breed, and maintain nursery grounds.142  Terrestrial ecosystems are also 
utterly dependent on precipitation, stormwater runoff and seasonal 
flooding.  The water cycle plays a major role in climate regulation, 
distributing energy, and stabilizing temperature.  Water in the atmosphere is 
one of the main mechanisms for the redistribution of heat around the globe, 
and generally makes for more equitable climates.143  Water ecosystems also 
perform hydrological regulation, accumulating water during wet periods and 
providing a reserve of water during dry periods.144  Large reservoirs and 
channels are mostly built by humans.  Water is one of the elements that 
make photosynthesis possible, not only producing the biomass that 
sustains the whole food chain, but also regulating the amount of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere because distinctive freshwater 
140. NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 6, at 584. Freshwater-dependent ecosystems are
mangroves, intertidal zones, and estuaries, which themselves provide another set of 
services. 
141. POSTEL & CARPENTER, supra note 141, at 204.
142. Id. at 205.
143. MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 59.
144. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS, VOLUME 1,
supra note 2, at 555. 
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ecosystems, such as wetlands, act as carbon sinks.145  As a result, freshwater 
ecosystems play a critical role in climate change mitigation. 
Water fertilizes the soil through floods, nutrient runoff, and rock 
weathering.  The hydrologic cycle plays a prominent role in the weathering 
and decomposition of rocks146 and distributes nutrients through surface 
runoff: “[w]eathering from geological sources generally produces relatively 
small quantities of nutrients over long periods of time but is nevertheless an 
important input mechanism that sustains the levels of potassium, iron, 
aluminum, sodium, and silicon in natural ecosystems.”147  Both the 
hydrological and the sedimentary cycle148 are responsible for the distribution 
of six elements throughout the spheres: hydrogen, carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, 
phosphorus and sulfur.  These elements are essential to sustain life.149  At 
the same time that natural floods provide essential nutrients distribution on 
soil from alluvial deposits and wetlands recharge, they may constitute a 
threat to human settlements and be implicated in substantial economic 
losses.  
It is important to note that strategic aquatic vegetation is able to 
attenuate surface flows, providing protection against natural hazards and 
recharging groundwater aquifers through soil infiltration.  To this end, the 
soil structure and texture is of fundamental importance.150  These 
groundwater aquifers are critical to human water supply, as explained 
previously, and also feed several wetlands151 which are among the most 
biological productive areas.152  Due to its saturation, the wetlands provide 
water, nutrients, shelter and habitat for many species.  As a result, wetlands 
provide high fish and shellfish harvesting.  Wetlands are crucial in flood 
protection and mitigation, sediment control, and filtration against nutrient 
runoff and other pollutants.  Because wetlands function as an excellent 
natural filtration system, in the 1970s these ecosystems began to be 
adopted as a cost effective alternative to the construction of tertiary 
145. Id. at 558.
146. MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 59.
147. Id. at 339.
148. The sedimentary cycle includes the processes of physical or chemical
erosion, nutrient transport, and sediment formation. See SUSAN E. ALEXANDER ET AL., 
THE INTERACTION OF CLIMATE AND LIFE, in NATURE’S SERVICES 74 (G. C. Daily ed. 1997). 
149. Id.
150. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 445.
151. See supra note 65.
152. MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 79.
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wastewater treatment facilities in many communities in the United States.153  
The ability of wetlands, as well any other aquatic ecosystem, to degrade and 
reduce the concentration of waste depends on both the properties of the 
waste and the properties of the particular ecosystem.154  Waste degradation 
is made possible due to the presence of microbes that break down organic 
chemicals, and the number of waste degrading microbes in turn depends on 
prior exposure to the waste.155  Nevertheless, compounds synthesized by the 
chemical industry are quite resistant to microbial degradation.156  Another 
key function that wetlands perform is to reduce concentrations of nitrogen 
in water.157  “Some wetlands have been found to reduce the concentration of 
nitrate by 90%, and artificially constructed wetlands have been developed 
specifically to treat nitrogen-rich sewage effluents.”158  Wetlands also act as a 
filter or trap for carbon-rich sediments and many waterborne wastes, 
including metals, organic chemicals, and pathogens.159  Until recently these 
useful services were neither understood nor recognized.  In addition, human 
utilization of one service, such as wastewater treatment, presents risk of 
diminution or even loss of other services.160  The progressive loss of 
wetlands all around the globe in the past century led the international 
community to sign the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands in 1971, providing 
the framework for national action and international cooperation for the 
conservation and wise use of wetlands and their resources.161 
Despite wetlands being the major providers of sediment retention and 
water purification, riparian vegetation not classified as wetlands also play an 
important role as buffer zones, trapping sediments, nutrients and 
pollutants.  In the United States, the restoration of riparian vegetation is 
one of the best management practices in use to protect the internal waters 
of the country when dealing with non point source pollution, especially 
153. KATHERINE C. EWEL, WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENT BY WETLANDS, in NATURE’S 
SERVICES 332 (G. C. Daily ed. 1997). 
154. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 425.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 426.
157. Id. at 436.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. EWEL, supra note 151, at 338.
161. Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat.
Ramsar, U.S.-Iran, February 2, 1971. U.N. TREATY SERIES NO. 14583. (As amended by the 
Paris Protocol, Dec. 3, 1982, and the Regina Amendments, May 28, 1987). 
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agricultural runoff.162  Phosphorous and nitrogen runoff from fertilizers and 
pesticides used by agricultural activities are the main causes of 
eutrophication in water bodies, leading algal blooms and oxygen 
depletion.163  Riparian vegetation also plays a major role in protecting 
stream banks from erosion and sedimentation.164 
In addition to the role played by wetlands in degrading waste, other 
aquatic ecosystems may also dilute waste by dispersion and advection.165 
These approaches were used for centuries up to the point at which the load 
of waste far exceeded the capacity of the environment to process them 
without undesirable change to the ecosystem.166  In the United States this 
was the reality in the 1970s when laws like the Clean Water Act were passed, 
requiring cities and industries to treat their wastewater before discharging it 
into water bodies.167  Nevertheless, virtually all countries, “still depend 
heavily upon the diluting capacity of natural waters.”168 
With all these functions played by fresh water and their ecosystems, 
Wilhelm Ripl draws an analogy to the human body, calling water the 
“bloodstream of the biosphere.”169  Undoubtedly, several ecosystems depend 
on freshwater ecosystems that are functioning well and “the contribution of 
freshwater ecosystems are complemented by the services provided by other 
kinds of ecosystems.”170  For this reason, a good understanding of the 
relationship between humans, plants, animals and habitats is crucial for 
meaningful policy in water and ecosystem management. As mentioned 
above, the links between structure, function and services provided by 
aquatic ecosystems is neither linear nor straightforward.  The behavior of a 
particular ecosystem is dependent not only on its composition and 
stressors, but also on linkages to surrounding systems — and these 
162. USDA, NRCS, CONSERVATION BUFFERS TO REDUCE PESTICIDE LOSSES (2000),
available at http://www.in.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/agronomy/newconbuf.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 16, 2010); NYS STORMWATER MANAGEMENT DESIGN MANUAL, Chapter 10, 
available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/water_pdf/dpremoval.pdf (last visited Dec. 
16, 2010). 
163. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 437.
164. Id. at 556.
165. Id. at 429
166. Id.
167. POSTEL & CARPENTER, supra note 141, at 200.
168. Id.
169. Wilhelm Ripl, Water: The Bloodstream of the Biosphere, 358 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC.
LOND. B 1921 (2003). 
170. NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 6, at 39.
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interconnections are not yet fully understood.171  The response to this lack of 
knowledge has been the development of generalized lists of potential 
functions that relate to broad categories of aquatic ecosystems.172  Although 
the list of potential functions performed by aquatic ecosystems can be 
estimated, it is a continuously evolving process.  Overall, services provided 
by freshwater ecosystems fit within the four categories used by the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: 
TABLE 2: 
Freshwater Ecosystem Services* 
Category Service
Provisioning Services Drinking, cooking, washing and other household uses; 
Manufacturing, thermoelectric cooling power 
generation and other industrial uses; Irrigation of 
crops, parks, golf courses, etc; Fish and Aquaculture; 
Waterfowl; Clams and mussels; Pelt; Medicines and 
bioengineering; Hydroelectric generation. 
Regulating Services Pollution dilution and Water Quality Control; 
Protection from soil erosion, siltation and natural 
hazard mitigation; Regulation of hydrological flows 
(buffer runoff, soil water infiltration, groundwater 
recharge, maintenance of base flows); Climate 
regulation. 
Cultural Services  Transportation; Recreation (Swimming, Boating, etc); 
Landscape aesthetics; Cultural, artistic and spiritual 
uses;  
Supporting Services Wildlife habitat (plants and animals); Soil fertilization; 
Flow regime required to maintain downstream habitat 
and uses; Water cycling. 
171. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 76.
172. Id. at 77.
* Adapted from Sandra Postel &Stephen Carpenter, FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEM 
SERVICES, IN NATURE’S SERVICES 196 (G. C. Daily ed. 1997); MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM 
ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SYNTHESIS ii 40, Box 2.1 (2005); and 
Dolf de Groot et al., PAY: ESTABLISHING PAYMENTS FOR WATERSHED SERVICES 16 (IUCN 
2008) (2006), available at http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/2006-054.pdf. 
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3. Threats to Freshwater Ecosystems
Within a watershed, the temperature, quality, quantity and timing of 
water draining and flowing in the stream is affected by the local geology, 
topography, type of soil, vegetation cover and, above all, human 
interference.  Despite the valuable range of services provided by freshwater 
ecosystem services, these ecosystems are under pressure and are among 
those most altered in the past fifty years.173  More than fifty percent of 
wetland in parts of North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand were 
converted to other uses during the twentieth century. 
The drivers of change were classified by the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment as direct and indirect.  The primary indirect drivers of 
degradation and loss have been population growth and increasing economic 
development.174  As human populations and individual well-being have 
increased, so has the consumption of ecosystem services.  Human 
population growth and the human need for food, water, energy, and raw 
materials are among the prime pressures placed upon ecosystems.  More 
advanced and sophisticated technologies that increase the ability to extract 
natural resources, as well as highly consumptive lifestyles, just make the 
situation worse, depleting resources and increasing the pollution of sinks.175  
Water is the “raw material” for many activities that are considered drivers of 
economic development.  In addition, the disproportionality in patterns of 
consumption explored above makes the case for overconsumption in many 
places.  
According to the Millennium Assessment, the direct drivers of change 
in freshwater ecosystem services can be classified as land use choices, 
pollution, unsustainable withdrawals, diversion of resources, invasive 
species and climate change. 176 These drivers of change not only affect the 
quality and quantity of water available for human needs, they also 
significantly affect ecosystems and the services they provide. 
a. Land Use Choices
Changes in the landscape to increase food production or allow 
development can modify the entire water cycle, because such changes 
determine the dynamics on the surface of the land and determine the 
173. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 31-32.
174. Id. at 64.
175. Id. at 829.
176. Id. at 67.
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relationship between green and blue water.177 Land cover changes affect the 
proportion of green to blue water flow and the proportion of fast-flowing 
surface storm runoff and slow slowing groundwater recharge feeding 
rivers.178  Common causes of habitat loss can be linked to conversion to 
urban environments, tourist resorts, ports, harbors, or any other form of 
infrastructure development, reservoirs and agricultural lands.179 
b. Water Withdrawal
Water is not distributed evenly around the globe, and in some places 
the rate and speed at which it has been withdrawn have led to falling water 
tables and saltwater intrusion.180  In some dry regions water has been 
withdrawn from fossil aquifers where the rate of recharge is so slow that 
such withdrawals constitute “water-mining, one time extraction from a 
depletable resource.”181  Regions that face severe water scarcity, such as 
Saudi Arabia and Northern Africa, are those who have been withdrawing 
fossil aquifers.182  Crops produced with mined waters gives the false sense of 
food security, because this production is obviously not sustainable.183  The 
toll paid for mismanaged diversion and large withdrawals consists of 
declining and contaminated aquifers, waterlogged and salted lands, 
shrinking lakes184 and rivers running dry, destruction of habitats, and loss of 
biodiversity.  The most striking example is that of the Aral Sea, where large 
scale irrigation canals diverted water for the production of high intensive-
water crops from two major rivers that used to drain into the Aral.185  The 
reduction of the inflow led to an increase in salt, fertilizer and pesticide 
concentrations in the water, and to a rapid shrinking of the lake by 
approximately eighty percent in volume of water until a point when the Lake 
separated in two parts: the Northern Aral Sea and the Southern Aral Sea.186  
177. MAUSER, supra note 74, at 77-78.
178. FALKENMARK, supra note 17, at 2044.
179. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 835.
180. This problem is particularly acute in the North China Plain, which has
been pumping groundwater at unsustainable levels, threatening not only future 
development and survival but also China’s wetlands. See GLEICK ET AL., supra note 85, 
at 85-86. The same dynamic holds true in India. See POSTEL, supra note 106, at 59. 
181. POSTEL, supra note 106, at 59.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 58.
185. MAUSER, supra note 74, at 37-43.
186. Id.
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Huge amounts of money and effort have been put in place to save the 
Northern Aral Sea, while the Southern Aral Sea is predicted to disappear in 
approximately ten years.187  
c. Pollution
Despite technological advances in pollution control, as well as 
increased regulation, pollution is likely to continue to increase in the future 
as a result of economic development driven by urbanization, industries and 
intensive agriculture systems.188  Pollution typically refers to chemicals or 
other substances in concentrations greater than would occur under natural 
conditions, and includes microbes, nutrients, heavy metals, organic 
chemicals, oil and sediments and heat.189  Although we usually think of water 
pollution as man-made or man-induced, it can also occur naturally as 
well.190  Pollutants in water bodies are usually classified and regulated as 
“point source pollution” (from pipelines and other identifiable sources), and 
nonpoint-source pollution (from stormwater runoff).191  Perhaps the major 
water pollution problem to date is eutrophication, defined as excessive 
nutrients caused mainly by agricultural runoff, animal manure and domestic 
sewage.192 
d. Water Diversion
The main form of water diversion is through the construction of Dams. 
“[D]ams are perhaps the human induced change that has had the most 
adverse overall impact on freshwater ecosystems.”193  They disrupt the water 
flow vital to the health of a watershed, block pathways for migratory species 
and fish, and change the temperature of the water, making the environment 
unsuitable for many species.194 
187. Id.
188. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 136.
189. Id.
190. JEFFREY G. MILLER, ANN POWERS AND NANCY L. ELDER, INTRODUCTION TO
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 2 (2008). 
191. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 136.
192. Id. at 138.
193. NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 6, at 590.
194. UNESCO-WWAP, Water in a Changing World, The United Nations World
Water Development Report 3 (2009) at 129, 149, 153. 
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e. Invasive Species
Invasive species are not native to a particular ecosystem, which are 
taken beyond their natural setting, either intentionally or unintentionally, 
and invade other ecosystems.  They might be flora or fauna, and they usually 
adversely affect native species and habitats because they compete with 
native species for food, water, physical space and other conditions essential 
to the survival of the native species.195  Examples of aquatic invasive species 
are: zebra mussels, Chinese mitten crabs, hydrilla, Eurasian watermilfoil, 
nutria, sea lamprey, Asian carp, and New Zealand mudsnail.196  Some 
species might cause small effects, while the effects caused by other species 
can be disastrous. 
f. Climate Change
Climate change is expected to exacerbate all of these existing 
pressures, thereby increasing the loss and degradation of many inland water 
systems.197  It is expected to drive changes in rainfall patterns, causing either 
more droughts or more floods than seen to date.198  The benefit from 
increased precipitation in some places can be outmatched by deleterious 
effects from floods, droughts and climate extreme variability.  Where the 
climate becomes drier, the most obvious effect is water scarcity due to less 
precipitation and increased evaporation.  Changes in water temperature and 
flow are likely to change the entire aquatic ecosystem.  The effects of climate 
change on water quality are less understood than its effects on water 
quantity, but there are definite connections between climate change and 
pathogens.199  An increase in waterbody temperatures may lead to more 
algal and bacterial blooms, which in turn lead to lower dissolved oxygen 
195. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 835.
196. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Fisheries and Habitat Conservation,
http://www.fws.gov/fisheries/ans/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
197. According to the IPCC’s definition, climate change “refers to any change
in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human 
activity.”  R. K. Pachauri and A. Reisinger, IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: Synthesis 
Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland 30 (2007). 
198. Id.
199. UNESCO-WWAP, Water in a Changing World, The United Nations World
Water Development Report 3 (2009) at 70. 
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concentrations.200  In addition, the water table is likely to lower, causing salt 
intrusion and negatively affecting prairie loopholes and wetlands.201 
Rising global temperatures will influence the snowpack formation in 
many places and likely affect the water supply during spring snowmelt, 
letting streams flow dry earlier in summer.  At the same time, an increase in 
temperatures is likely to increase the rate of snow melting in other places, 
causing spring floods and negatively affecting Arctic ecosystems.202  The 
melting of this ice sheet may also release a huge amount of methane 
trapped in Iceland, thereby increasing the amount of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere manifolds and affecting humans and ecosystems 
worldwide.203  As modern societies withdraw, divert, pollute or otherwise 
impair freshwater ecosystems, they limit the quantity or the capacity of 
these ecosystems to provide the services upon which they depend.  The 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment reported that the capacity of ecosystems 
to provide clean and reliable sources of water is in decline in many parts of 
the world.204 
III. Payments for Ecosystem Services
A. Challenges in Designing a Policy for Ecosystem Service
Protection
When we think about how water resources and healthy ecosystems are 
vital for life support and welfare, we wonder why rational human beings, 
acting consciously, take measures that lead to environmental degradation 
and ecosystem service loss.  The reasons for this behavior can be linked to 
our partial knowledge of the links between the structure and function of 
ecosystem services and their complexity, the nature of public goods of most 
of these services, and our undervaluation of them.  In addition, human 
beings do not always react rationally and have a hard time making 
concessions and sacrifices in the present to avoid future losses. 
200. HEATHER COOLEY, WATER MANAGEMENT IN A CHANGING CLIMATE, in GLEIK ET AL., 
THE WORLD’S WATER 2008-2009: THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 9, 15 
(Peter H. Gleick ed., 2009). 
201. Pachauri and Reisinger, supra note 191, at 33.
202. Id. at 31.
203. SUSAN Q. STRANAHAN, MELTING ARCTIC OCEAN RAISES THREAT OF “METHANE TIME 
BOMB”, Yale Environment 360, October 30, 2008 at http://e360.yale.edu/content/ 
feature.msp?id=2081. 
204. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 832.
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1. Complexity of the Problem and Lack of Knowledge
As already explored in Chapter 2, ecosystem services are ecologically, 
geographically and economically much more complex than any other kind of 
commodity or service traded in the marketplace.205  Not only is the subject 
complex, but our understanding of the dynamics between structures and 
functions is in its infancy and this lack of knowledge is a barrier for the 
identification and promotion of many ecosystem services.206  We can make 
general predictions on the effects of actions on a gross scale, such as the 
detrimental effects of clear cutting upon water quality and quantity, but we 
cannot predict with certainty how minor specific local actions affect the 
delivery of ecosystem services.207  If the scientific community faces 
challenges due to the complexity of the topic, the general public’s ignorance 
with regards to ecosystem services can also be blamed on the modern 
society’s dissociation of technology and natural processes and functions.208  
In addition, tension can exist between various ecosystem services, 
where the increased productivity of some services might collide with the 
delivering of others.209  A classical example can be drawn from a carbon 
sequestration project based on a large scale monoculture plantation. While 
it might indeed sequester carbon, it also negatively impacts biodiversity and 
creates opportunities for increased pests and diseases which might affect 
water bodies and soil due to increased use of pesticides.210 
2. Public Goods
Public goods are those enjoyed in common; their use by one person 
does not preclude their use by others.  Subsequently, they are considered 
non rival and nonexcludable in consumption.211  In contrast, goods which, 
when used by one person, preclude their use by others (i.e., goods that are 
excludable and rival in consumption), are generally called private goods and 
205. See supra note 51.
206. See supra note 55.
207. James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 880 (2005). 
208. James Salzman, A Field of Green?  The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services, 21 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 133, 134 (2006). 
209. Thompson, supra note 42, at 473.
210. FOREST TRENDS ET AL., PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: GETTING STARTED: A
PRIMER 12 (2008). 
211. EBAN S. GOODSTEIN, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 39 (5th ed. 2008).
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are allocated by markets or quasi-market processes.212  There are also goods 
that are nonexcludable but rival, and goods that are excludable but nonrival 
in consumption.213  Water withdrawals for households, agriculture, industrial 
purposes, and commodity goods such as fish, tend to be rivalrous and 
excludable in their uses, while water for recreation, aesthetic purposes or 
wildlife habitat is largely nonrivalrous and nonexcludable.214  Water quality, 
however, can be nonexcludable but rival in consumption because although 
no one can be prevented from enjoying clean water, clean water 
consumption by one might prevent others from its use.215  
The characteristic of public good of most ecosystem services subjects 
them to both over-consumption and under-production.216  In 1968 the 
famous ecologist, Garrett Hardin coined the termed “tradgey of the 
commons.”217  In his seminal paper Tradegy of the Commons on the work of the 
overexploitve nature of society and public goods, Hardin explained that 
individuals acting individually in their self-interest will try to maximize their 
individual gains, overexploiting the common resources, even though it 
eventually leads to a collective disaster.218  The most common problem 
related to ecosystem services, however, is what J. B. Ruhl calls the “Tragedy 
of Ecosystem Services — a case of under-production that happens because 
mechanisms are missing for rewarding investments in natural capital that 
produce ecosystem services.”219  This is a situation wherein beneficiaries or 
buyers of goods and services have no incentive to pay suppliers, because an 
action taken or cost shouldered by one individual will benefits others that 
cannot be excluded.220  As a result, everyone either waits for someone else to 
take the initiative  or try to “free ride” on someone else’s action.  Providers in 
turn have no incentive to supply these ecosystem services, since they are 
212. ROBERT A. YOUNG, DETERMINING THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER: CONCEPTS AND
METHODS 6 (2005). 
213. NATASHA LANDELL-MILLS & INA PORRAS, SILVER BULLET OR FOOLS’ GOLD? A
GLOBAL REVIEW OF MARKETS FOR FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES AND THEIR IMPACTS ON THE 
POOR 8 (2002). 
214. Young, supra note 218, at 7.
215. Stefanie Engel, Stefano Pagiola & Sven Wunder, Designing Payments for
Environmental Services in Theory and Practice: an Overview of the Issues, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 
663, 666 n. 8 (2008). 
216. Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 11, at 294.
217. GARRETT HARDIN, THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
218. Id.
219. Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 11, at 294.
220. Id.
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not rewarded for doing so.221  This lack of reward that is likely to cause the 
under-production of these services is called an “externality” by 
economists.222  
3. Externalities
Externalities can be classified as negative or positive.  Pollution is a 
classic example of a negative externality; a situation where the full cost of 
pollution or other form of environmental degradation is not borne by the 
producer or consumer of that specific activity.223  In opposition to negative 
externalities, positive externalities do not result in “fully remunerated 
contribution towards a public good.”224  A classic example of a positive 
externality is a native forest that provides several ecosystem services such as 
carbon sequestration, climate stabilization, water filtration, and biodiversity 
habitat.  None of these services are remunerated or have exact market 
values because they are mostly public goods.  Instead, things such as timber 
and agriculture products, which are both activities that require changes in 
land management, have market value.  Markets typically fail to remunerate 
these services due to the absence of property rights or other legal means to 
require payment for the services rendered.225  As a result governments step 
in to correct these “market failures” and ensure the supply of these public 
goods.226  Governments in turn have their own constraints, such as budgets 
deficits, high transaction costs, imperfect knowledge and bureaucracy.227  
4. Lack of Signal Prices and Valuation
The absence of markets for public goods leads to the lack of a price 
mechanism to signal the scarcity or degradation of ecosystem services.  Any 
time policy makers and administrators decide how to allocate or protect 
resources they make decisions that involve trade-offs.  These kinds of 
decisions are mostly economic decisions based on the value society assigns 
221. Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 11, at 294.
222. Id.
223. Goodstein, supra note 217, at 32.
224. Jan Keppler, Public Goods, Infrastructure, Externalities and Subsidies: A conceptual
Framework for the “IEA Questionnaire on Government Interventions in the Energy Sector” in 
OECD, Subsidies and Environment: Exploring the Linkages 195 (1996). 
225. Landell-Mills & Porras, supra note 219 at 7.
226. To correct these market failures, government can adopt different
approaches, which are briefly described below in Chapter 6. 
227. Landell-Mills & Porras, supra note 219 at 9.
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to these resources.  Simply stated, the value of an ecosystem service is how 
much it is worth to society and how much society would forego in exchange 
for the delivery of this service.  
Edward Farnworth and Walter Westman, pioneers in the field of 
ecological economics, stressed the gap between ecologists and economists 
when assigning a value to ecosystem services.228  While economists utilize 
private market and nonmarket methods to estimate the value of goods and 
services in monetary terms, ecologists are adamantly opposed to this 
approach and defend the intrinsic value of nature.229  Behind these methods 
of valuation lays a philosophical choice.  Biocentric advocates assert that 
natural resources have an intrinsic value, meaning that species and other 
natural beings have intrinsic rights to exist and prosper, regardless of their 
ascribed economic value.230  Under the intrinsic theory of value, a service or 
good has a value in itself, not as a means to achieve something else.  The 
value of goods and services is not a function of its utility made by personal 
judgments, therefore, any attempt to monetarily quantify what is 
intrinsically valuable is destined to fail.  On the other hand, there are 
anthropocentric utilitarian advocates who argue that natural resources are 
valuable only insofar as they are useful to human beings.231  According to 
this theory the value of natural resources derives from the utility they 
provide to humankind, called an instrumental value.  This utility is 
interpreted broadly, to encompass not only actual or potential direct use value 
such as the consumption of natural goods or recreational activities but also 
indirect use value of natural resources such as the nutrient cycle that sustains 
the food chain232 and nonuse values.  Nonuse values derive from the value that 
people assign to something based solely on knowing that it exists, even if 
they will never see it or experience it.233  
Putting an economic value on ecosystem services is not that simple 
because of the complexity of the links between structure, function, and 
derived ecosystem services.  Making the translation from ecosystem 
structure and function to ecosystem services is difficult because the causal 
228. Edward G. Farnworth et al., The Value of Natural Ecosystems: An Economic and
Ecological Framework, 8 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 275, 275 (1981). 
229. Id.
230. Laurence H. Goulder & Donald Kennedy, Valuing Ecosystem Services:
Philosophical Bases and Empirical Methods in Daily, supra note 16, at 26. 
231. Id. at 24.
232. Id. at 25.
233. Id. at 25.
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relationship between them is neither linear nor straightforward.234  The 
complexity and variability of ecosystems also makes it difficult to develop 
models with broad and universal application.235  In addition, most ecosystem 
services are public goods and, therefore, not allocated by markets.  The 
market price is the simplest and most common valuation method for goods 
and services, but since ecosystem services have no market price, economists 
developed alternative tools.  These tools are described below in section C. 
5. Discount Rate
The economic value of an asset, in this case ecosystem services, is the 
willingness to pay and willingness to accept,236 for outcomes that might 
accrue in the future.  This requires spending money today to receive benefits 
in the future.  However, because these investments have an opportunity cost 
today, such as the interest rates, the benefit is worth more today than in the 
future.237  Economists, thus apply a discount rate to convert to future values 
from the present.  This is called the social discount rate and refers to the 
rate at which society as a whole is willing to trade the present for the 
future.238  In addition, economists have observed that the “time preference” 
reveals that individuals reveal a widespread desire to consume today rather 
than save for tomorrow.239  Consequently, benefits received at present are 
worth more than benefits received in the future. 
Setting the appropriate discount rate for environmental policies is a 
heated debate.  For example, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change has been both backed and criticized due to the low discount rate 
applied.240  Overall, the higher the discount rate that is applied, the less 
234. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 2.
235. Thompson, supra note 42, at 471.
236. WTP is the amount an individual or group is willing to pay to secure the
change. To access this value, economists gather information generated by market 
transactions that signalizes how much society is willing to pay in order to enjoy that 
particular service or good. WTA is captured by observed behavior that show how 
much society would accept as compensation to do without the good or service. See 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 244. 
237. Goodstein, supra note 217, at 98.
238. W. Douglas Shaw, Water Resource Economics and Policy: An Introduction 39
(2005). 
239. Goodstein, supra note 217, at 106.
240. Hal R. Varian, Recalculating the Costs of Global Climate Change, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/14/ 
business/14scene.html  (Last visited on Dec. 16, 2010). 
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attractive present investments for the future will be.241  An ethical 
consideration that arises here is that the discount rate that will guide 
actions or investments affecting future generations is set by the current one. 
A political decision that may deplete a natural resource involves the implicit 
assumption that future generations will not place as high a value on these 
natural resources as current generations place on the chosen depletive 
activity.242  Another common assumption is that future generations will be 
able to find substitutes or technologies to replace these depleted natural 
resources.243  How can we assume that future generations will place a lower 
value on ecosystem services than we do currently, or will be much wealthier 
in order to offset the losses?  The limits of natural capital seem to indicate 
that this assumption is wrongheaded.  
If solving our current problems of environmental degradation and loss 
of ecosystem services is also a matter of better policy choices and 
management, applying the appropriate discount rate is likely to play an 
important role.  There is no simple rule for choosing the discount rate to 
compare present and future costs and benefits.244  Development of different 
scenarios with multidisciplinary contributions seems to be a wise path to 
follow at this moment.  The TEEB Report recommends that “a variety of 
discount rates — including zero and negative rates, may be used depending 
on the nature of the assets being valued, the time period involved, the 
degree of uncertainty, and the scope of the project or policy being 
evaluated.”245  Barton H. Thompson points out that behind the discussion of 
which rate of discount to apply lies the fear that people have difficulty in 
making any sacrifice in order to avoid uncertain future losses, and the 
tendency to not only minimize future risks but also to optimistically believe 
they will be better in the future in order to avoid, reduce, or ameliorate the 
risks.246   
241. Goodstein, supra note 217, at 100.
242. Farnworth, supra note 234, at 275.
243. Goodstein, supra note 217, at 107.
244. TEEB, supra note 42, at 26.
245. Id.
246. Barton H. Thompson Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENVTL LAW 241, 262-65 (2000). 
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B. Methods for Estimating the Economic Value of
Ecosystem Services
The economic value of ecosystem services is generally estimated using 
the so-called total economic value, which includes use and nonuse values.247  
Although the terminology may vary slightly, economists classify values as i) 
direct use value; (ii) indirect use value; (iii) option value; and (iv) nonuse 
value. 248  The first three are generally referred to as use value.249  Direct use 
value comprises goods and services that are used consumptively such as 
food, timber, water, etc., or nonconsumptively, such as recreational and 
cultural activities.250  Indirect use values usually comprise regulating services 
such as carbon sequestration and water filtration.  Option value is the value 
people place on protecting nature for future use by oneself  or by 
others/heirs, for ethical reasons, and this might include provisioning, 
regulating or cultural services.251  Nonuse values, also known as existence 
value or passive use value, are those values unrelated to use and include the 
value that is assigned to something by simply knowing that it exists even if 
this resource or place is never used or experienced.252 
To measure changes in welfare and capture the total economic use and 
non use value of ecosystem services economists rely primarily on two 
alternative ways: willingness to pay (“WTP”) and willingness to accept 
(“WTA”).253  Although it was expected that WTP and WTA for the same good 
or service would be quite similar, empirical studies have already 
demonstrated that there might be great differences between them.254  The 
National Research Council suggests that:  
Usually, the willingness-to-accept method, which is not 
constrained by income, yields a greater value for an improvement 
than does the willingness-to-pay measure. Economic theory 
suggests that willingness to accept is appropriate for valuing the 
removal of a service to which people have a right, whereas 
247. Young, supra note 218 at 40.
248. The World Bank, TNC and IUCN, How Much is an Ecosystem Worth? Assessing
the Economic Value of Conservation 9 (2004), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/external/ 
worldbank/worldbank-es-value-01-en.pdf. 
249. Id.
250. Id. at 9-10.
251. Id. at 10; TEEB, supra note 42,  at 63.
252. The World Bank, supra note 254, at 10.
253. See supra note 220.
254. Young, supra note 218, at 29.
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willingness to pay is appropriate for valuing the provision of a 
new service or more of an existing service in a situation where 
there is no right to receive this service.255 
Since most ecosystem services have no market price that could 
indicate willingness to pay or accept, they are set using nonmarket methods 
through revealed and stated preferences.  In some rare circumstances, 
benefit transfer methods can also be applied.256  Some methods of valuation 
fit better when evaluating ecosystem services that present public good 
characteristics, while private good services are usually best served by other 
methods, and some approaches can be applied to both.257  The purpose of 
this chapter is to present the main economic methods that are applied in 
ecosystem valuation and its basic concepts. 
1. Revealed and Stated Preference Methods
Revealed preference methods aim to infer the economic value of 
ecosystem services from observed behaviors.  
a. Market Price Method
Mainstream economic theories argue that the value of goods and 
services “rest on the underlying demand and supply relationships that are 
usually, but not always, reflected in market prices.”258  Markets are believed 
to allocate resources in the most efficient way, since this theory presumes 
that economic efficiency is the primary goal of society259 because essentially 
it is what brings the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people.260  
The theory proposes that markets allocate goods and services from the 
lowest and worst to the highest and best economic use, assuming the best 
use is the most efficient and does not take into account matters of equity or 
fairness.261  Those resources that are traded in the marketplace have a 
market price that reflects the consumer’s willingness to pay for the 
resources, which is essentially the demand for that output.  When 
consumers make choices among different and alternative uses, or 
255. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 244.
256. The World Bank, supra note 254, at 12.
257. Young, supra note 218.
258. Id. at 20.
259. Id. at 21.
260. Shaw, supra note 222, at 36.
261. Id. at 26-27.
 
West  Northwest, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 2012 
237 
opportunities,262 of scarce resources they reveal preferences and the 
economic value is the sum of all consumers’ willingness to pay in that 
market.263  The economic value is determined by utilizing standard economic 
techniques for measuring the economic benefits from marketed goods, 
based on the quantity people purchase at different prices, and the quantity 
supplied at different prices.264, 265  
b. Travel Cost Method
Some ecosystem services, such as aesthetic views and recreational 
experiences, may not be directly bought and sold in markets.  Hence, this 
method gathers data from the costs of traveling to a particular destination 
for recreational, aesthetic and cultural purposes, and the time and cost to 
travel represent the willingness to pay.  The basic travel cost method 
assumes that changes in behavior due to increasing costs of traveling 
correspond to changes in demand due to an increase in entrance fees, 
creating a demand curve from which willingness to pay can be derived.266  
This method presents several challenges despite being a method in which 
environmental economists have the most confidence.267  Questions include: 
How to measure the cost of travelling? Whether to include the 
transportation time in the total cost of traveling or treat it as another 
variable? How to measure the opportunity cost?268 How to account for 
substitute sites or handle multiple purpose trips?269  If an ecosystem change 
affects recreational fishing through a change in fish quantity or quality, for 
example, the value of the impact (decrease) on recreational fishing can be 
estimated using the travel-cost approach. This method, however, would not 
262. Opportunity use are the best next alternative for a particular resources
and opportunity costs are the benefits forgone for using this resource for one 
purpose instead of the best next alternative.  See Young, supra note 218, at 34. 
263. Id.
264. See Dennis King and Marisa Mazzotta, Market Price Method. Ecosystem
Valuation (2002), available at http://www.ecosystemvaluation.org/market_price.htm.  
265. Young, supra note 218, at 108. (Regarding freshwater resources, direct
observation can be done for water rights transactions that are increasingly occurring 
in the arid and semi-arid areas of the Western United States, though the “limited 
number of actual markets and the wide fluctuation in asset prices [water rights 
prices] suggest caution in applying the observed water prices for public planning 
purposes.”). Young, supra note 218, at 108. 
266. Id. at 121.
267. Id. at 128.
268. Id. at 124.
269. Id. at 128.
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take into consideration the change on other ecosystem services not involved 
in that particular recreational activity.270  
c. The Productivity Method
The productivity method, also referred to as production function, is 
used to estimate the economic value of ecosystem products or services that 
contribute to the production of commercially marketed goods.271  In this 
case, ecosystem services are inputs in the production to the extent that they 
support or protect the production of other marketed goods,272 and changes 
in market prices of the outputs provide value estimates of these services.  
d. The Hedonic Pricing Method
The hedonic pricing method is used to estimate economic values for 
ecosystem or environmental services that directly affect property values and 
is often used to value environmental amenities that affect the price of 
residential properties such as air quality and scenic beauty.273  The 
assumption is that changes in property values due to the environmental 
characteristics found in that particular location provide an estimate of this 
characteristic’s values.  Regarding water resources, supply or quality of water 
are attributes usually recognized and valued by buyers when purchasing a 
property.274  The hedonic method usually reflects actual economic behavior 
in real estate markets.  Although the method provides tools to isolate the 
contribution of ecosystem services to the whole value of the property, real 
estate might be subject to fluctuations275 or bubbles, as seen recently in the 
United States subprime mortgage crisis. 
e. Damage and Substitute Cost Method
The damage cost-avoided, replacement cost, and substitute cost 
methods are related methods that estimate values of ecosystem services 
based on either the cost of avoiding damages due to service loss, the cost of 
replacing ecosystem services, or the cost of providing substitute services 
270. National Research Council, supra note 19, at 248.
271. The World Bank, supra note 254, at 11.
272. National Research Council, supra note 19, at 249.
273. Id.
274. Young, supra note 218, at 113.
275. Id. at 115.
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using the best available alternative.276  The premise adopted is that people 
will change their behavior or spend money to avoid undesirable outcomes, 
incurring the costs of replacement of a particular ecosystem service, or the 
cost of the next best alternative.  As a result, the avoided cost provides an 
estimate of how much this service is worth.277  The assumption is that “a 
rational person will adopt a defensive behavior as long as the value of the 
damage avoided is greater than the cost of the defensive steps.”278  The 
general premise is that the maximum willingness to pay is not greater than 
the cost of the damage avoided279 or the cost of that good or service 
provided via some other process or technology.280  This method must 
assume effective demand for the next best alternative.  In other words, it 
assumes that this other project or technology would be undertaken in the 
absence of the action under consideration.281  This assumption is one of the 
major weaknesses of this method, since an alternative project or more 
expensive technology can always be conceived, thereby producing a false 
estimate of value and net benefits.282  This method also assumes that people 
are aware of the harmful impacts and that activities can be undertaken to 
avoid or reduce the negative impacts ensuing,283 which raises the classic 
problem of imperfect knowledge in market transactions.  Two classic 
examples of this method’s application are how much it would cost to build a 
filtration plant to achieve safe drinking water standards or to stop flooding 
and erosion control that forests and wetlands naturally provide.284  The 
problem is that some ecosystem services are not really replaceable, such as 
climate regulation, and the failure of the Biosphere 2 Project is an exemplary 
reminder of this limitation.  This method of valuation, however, cannot be 
confused with cost-effective analysis that is performed in many decision-
making processes. Rather, this method provides guidance and information 
for this process. 
276. The World Bank, supra note 254, at 11.
277. National Research Council, supra note 19, at 248.
278. Young, supra note 218, at 133.
279. Id. at 134
280. Id. at 102.
281. Id. at 102.
282. Id. at 104.
283. National Research Council, supra note 19, at 249.
284. Thompson, supra note 31, at 298-301.
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2. Stated Preference Methods
Stated preference methods aim to infer values through survey 
responses, when data obtained from observed behavior that could 
theoretically reveal preferences is not available. 
a. The Contingent Valuation Method
The contingent valuation method is estimated by asking people, in a 
survey, how much they would be willing to pay for specific environmental 
services.  This type of survey is conducted in a process where respondents 
are provided with detailed information regarding the goods or services being 
valued, and can be used to estimate economic values for all kinds of 
ecosystem and environmental services, both use and nonuse values.285  The 
survey can pose a direct question such as “How much would you willing to 
pay for X?”  Or can be conducted using the iterative bidding, where 
respondents are asked if they are willing to pay a specific amount for X.  In 
the case where there is an affirmative answer, the method continues 
increasing the price until the answer is negative.  If the initial response is 
negative, then the subsequent questions decrease the price until the point 
where the answer is affirmative.286  Another approach is that of a payment 
card, where respondents are asked to choose a value among several 
alternatives, ranging from zero to a very large number.287  
Each approach presents pros and cons; yet the contingent valuation 
method allows for flexibility and can be used to estimate proposed changes, 
in addition to already verified changes in goods or services.288  However, this 
method is one of the most susceptible to biases and has suffered criticism 
since its first utilization.289  Although contingent valuation method has been 
refined since its inception, many challenges remain.290  This method was the 
primary approach used by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (“NOAA”) to estimate nonuse value loss, such as damages to 
wildlife caused by the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound in 
1989.291  Currently, it is likely to be considered as an alternative to value 
285. Young, supra note 218, at 137.
286. Id. at 138.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 137.
289. Id. at 138.
290. Id.
291. Richard T. Carson et al., Contingent Valuation and Lost Passive Use: Damages
from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 25 ENVTL. AND RESOURCES ECON. 257 (2003). 
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damages caused by the British Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 
April 2010.  
b. The Choice Method
The choice method, like the contingent valuation, is a hypothetical 
method that asks people to make choices based on a hypothetical 
scenario.292  Unlike contingent valuation that aims to find willingness to pay 
based on direct questions of monetary values, the choice method presents 
the respondents with several alternatives, each characterized by several 
attributes.293  Based on the hypothetical choices or tradeoffs that people 
make, values are inferred from statistical analysis.294  Similarly to contingent 
valuation, this method can be used to estimate economic values for virtually 
any ecosystem or environmental service, and especially nonuse values. 
Compared to the contingent valuation method, it provides more details 
regarding the respondent’s utility functions.295  At the same time, it poses 
more complex questions to respondents and requires a significant statistical 
analysis by the individual posing the questions.296  
3. Benefit Transfer Method
Benefit transfer method refers to a method where values are estimated 
for similar services and goods, in similar contexts, and the results are 
transferred to another set of goods or services not actually measured.  Benefit 
transfer method is usually applied when limitations on time, resources and 
perhaps technical skills do not permit a full empirical analysis.297  This is a 
common situation in smallscale projects, preliminary assessments or 
projects in developing countries.298  Under this approach values inferred 
from a study site are transferred to a policy site.299  Despite its advantage as 
less expensive and less time consuming the benefit transfer method does 
not find consensus among economists as a reliable method.  While some 
argue that it can provide valid and reliable estimates under certain 
292. The World Bank, supra note 254, at 11.
293. Young¸ supra note 218, at 148.
294. Id. at 148.
295. Id. at 151.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 105.
298. Id. at 152.
299. Id. at 152-153.
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conditions,300 others argue that it is very rare to find similarity in these 
conditions.301 
4. Which Method Applies?
As shown, the economic values of ecosystem services can be measured 
in monetary terms, with varied degrees of accuracy, using various 
techniques, since there is no “one size fits all” method.  All methods of 
ecosystem valuation require time, resources and econometrical skills, to 
different degrees.  Revealed preference methods are considered more 
accurate, because they derive values from actual, observed consumer 
behavior in real contexts.302  However, they require a certain number of 
social experiments to yield the necessary data, which is not always possible. 
Therefore, the number of published environmental valuations based on 
revealed preferences is fewer than those using stated preference methods.303  
Stated preference methods, on the other hand, can be designed to test 
specific hypotheses, and do not rely on natural experiments.  Moreover, they 
seem to be the only way to obtain nonuse and future proposed policy 
values.304  
As shown, different methods can be applied, depending on the context 
and needs of a given situation.  However, the more precise and accurate the 
method, the more time and resource consuming it can be.  In addition, it 
can be argued that the greater the income and wealth, the greater the 
willingness to pay.305  Assigning values based on equally aggregated 
individual willingness to pay and to accept may lead to different results for 
the same goods and services, for reasons of different wealth and income, 
which raises issues of equity and environmental justice.  As a result, 
corrections or additional elements must be considered in the decision-
making process.  
Many authors argue that in a PES scheme, full economic valuation of 
ecosystem services or opportunity costs is not required, yet it can set a price 
range and predetermine whether a PES scheme is economically feasible.306  
300. Mark L Plummer, Assessing Benefit Transfer for the Valuation of Ecosystem Services
(2009), 7 Frontiers in Ecology and the Envir. 38, (Feb. 2009). 
301. Id. at 40.
302. Young, supra note 218 at 156. Id.
303. Id.
304. Shaw, supra note 222, at 254; Young, supra note 218, at 157.
305. National Research Council, supra note 19, at 88.
306. Sven Wunder, The Efficiency of Payments for Environmental Services in Tropical
Conservation, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 48, 53-54 (2007). 
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Indeed, economic valuation is not an end in itself but a means to provide 
information that can be used to make better choices concerning ecosystem 
service management.  The extent to which economic valuation will be 
conducted depends on the context of the services being provided and the 
resources available.   
C. The Policy Toolbox
To address environmental problems with such degrees of complexity, 
there is no silver bullet307 or one size fits all308 solution; rather a combination 
of approaches is required.  The solution calls for what professor Barton H. 
Thompson calls “governance of the commons,”309 which encompasses 
governmental intervention, economic incentives and political support. 
Where several different market failures coexist, different instruments must 
be combined.310  The toolkit applied is labeled by Professor James Salzman 
as the five Ps: prescriptive regulation, property rights, penalties, payments, 
and persuasion.311 
1. Command and Control
Prescriptive regulation, also called command and control, is the most 
common and widely used mechanism to achieve environmental 
protection.312  In simple terms, it sets a goal and prescribes mandatory, 
allowed, and forbidden actions to achieve it, and imposes penalties for non-
compliance.  Because the regulated community shoulders the burden 
equally, this mechanism is said to be less flexible than market-based 
307. Silver bullet is a metaphor used to describe a straightforward and
effective solution, one used by Landell-Mills and Porras to describe a solution to 
tackle economic social and environmental problems.  See Landell-Mills and Porras, 
supra note 219. 
308. See Kenneth R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 225-26 (2000) (“The optimal choice of policy instrument 
to implement a particular pollution abatement goal depends upon the nature of the 
pollutant, the kind of harm the pollutant causes, the available control technologies, 
the number and type of polluting entities, and the type of market failure. In short, 
when it comes to environmental policy instrument choice, one size does not fit all.”).  
309. Barton H. Thompson Jr., supra note 230, at 266.
310. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205 at 669.
311. James Salzman and Barton H. Thompson Jr., Environmental Law and Policy
47 (3rd ed. 2010). 
312. Id.
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mechanisms.313  Under this mechanism, the two approaches commonly used 
to deal with environmental pollution are uniform technology-based and 
performance-based standards.314  While technology-based standards require 
a particular technology to be used, performance-based standards set a 
specific goal but do not specify the means to achieve this goal.315  Variants of 
prescriptive regulation traditionally used to address conservation of 
biodiversity are the establishment of strictly protected areas, Integrated 
Conservation and Development Projects (“ICDP”), and sustainable forest 
management; the latter two are considered a more indirect approach to 
conserve biodiversity316 and a mechanism for poverty alleviation.317  The idea 
of protecting areas underpinned the creation of the National Parks system in 
the United States and inspired similar initiatives worldwide.318  While the 
creation of protected areas necessarily implies removing people from the 
area and forbidding any kind of human impact, ICDP are usually referred to 
as projects that seek to integrate development and conservation concerns, 
applying holistic efforts that comprise building local institutional capacity to 
obtain local goodwill toward conservation and influence government 
policies.319  
2. Economic Incentives
Another type of mechanism to address environmental problems is 
incentive-based policies.  As the name suggests, this policy uses incentives 
(mostly economic incentives) to drive behaviors toward the policy goal.  An 
economic incentive program can be defined as “any program that provides 
an economic benefit for pollution reductions or an economic penalty for 
pollution.”320  As a result, economic incentive programs include either 
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation: A New Era from and Old Idea? 18 Ecology L. Q. 1, 5-6 (1991). 
316. Paul Ferraro and Agness Kiss, Direct Payments to Conserve Biodiversity, 298 Sci.
1718 (2002). 
317. Wunder, supra note 23, at 20.
318. Brent M. Swallow et al., Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services in
the Developing World: Framing Pan-Tropical Analysis and Comparison, 14 ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY 
26 (2009).  
319. Wunder, supra note 23, at 6.
320. The author uses pollution reduction as the environmental goal but the
incentive-based design can be used for any other environmental goal. David M. 
Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and 
Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 323 (1998). 
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positive or negative incentives.  The OECD Report labels policy instruments 
as economic instruments when “they affect estimates of costs and benefits 
of alternative actions open to economic agents,” classifying them as: charges 
and taxes, subsidies, tradeable emission permits, and deposit-refund 
systems.321  Another category can be added to this list: certification or 
labeling programs.  
Environmental taxes and charges322 rely on making environmental 
pollution expensive and thus, forcing polluters to internalize the previously 
external pollution cost, up to the point where the marginal cost of 
controlling this pollution equals the tax or fee charged.323  In this context, 
the overall cost of achieving a given pollution control target will be 
minimized, because those with lower marginal abatement costs will abate 
emissions more than polluters with higher costs.324  When set at an 
appropriate level, taxes provide a permanent incentive to adopt less 
polluting (or environmentally degrading) activities.325  However, this 
approach puts a price on pollution but does not limit the amount that will 
be generated.  As a result, it is blamed for being uncertain regarding the 
level of pollution control that will be achieved.326  
Subsidies, broadly defined, are “public payments which directly benefit 
the private production or consumption of goods and services.  They are 
justified in political decision-making by the real or presumed existence of 
positive side-effects generated by these activities which warrant higher level 
of production that would prevail in the absence of such subsidies.”327  They 
aim to transfer benefits and adopt measures that benefit society as a 
whole328 and can be done through grants, soft loans or tax allowances.329   
321. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD),
Evaluating Economic Instruments for Environmental Policy 15 (1997). 
322. Environmental taxes are compulsory, unrequited payments to general
government using as a tax base something that has a proven negative impact on the 
environment when used or released. Charges are compulsory requited payments, 
although the payment is not always proportional to the service rendered. See 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Environmental 
Taxes and Green Tax Reform 18 (1997). 
323. Hahn and Stavins, supra note 292, at 8.
324. OECD, supra note 299, at 18.
325. Id.
326. Hahn and Stavins, supra note 292, at 8.
327. Jan Keppler, supra note 209, at 193.
328. Stephen Barg, Eliminating Perverse Subsidies: What’s the Problem? in OECD,
supra note 209, at 29. 
329. OECD, supra note 298, at 17.
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A deposit-refunds system is a surcharge laid on the price of potentially 
polluting products that is refunded as the pollution is avoided by returning 
these products to a collection system.330  Certification programs are those 
that track the entire life cycle of products and services, aiming to reduce the 
environmental impact on both the supply and production chain and attract 
concerned consumers; carbon labeling is one of the most notorious 
examples.331 
By using market-based approaches or property right approaches, 
commonly known as tradable permit systems or cap-and-trade systems, 
governments allocate initial property rights, set the limits of resource 
exploitation or pollution, and establish the penalties for noncompliance and 
then step back, letting the market allocate this property rights in the most 
efficient way.  Those who are able to control pollution at a lower cost can 
sell their permits to those who cannot do it so efficiently.332  U.S. based 
programs such as wetland banking, the Endangered Species Act 
conservation bank, and the acid rain program are good examples of markets 
created as a result of regulation and the carbon market under the Kyoto 
Protocol is the primary example in the international marketplace. Market-
based policies were suggested by economists in the 1960s but were only 
widely adopted in the 1990s and are perceived as more efficient and able to 
foster innovation when compared to traditional command and control 
regulations.333  The theory goes that because polluters have an economic 
incentive to reduce their pollution below mandatory levels they will seek out 
new technologies, and because regulators do not need to gather information 
from the regulated community and choose which technology should be 
adopted, leaving the market to decide which will be used, this approach is 
more cost effective.334  This policy was criticized for not addressing problems 
related to environmental justice and pollution hotspots for trading 
commodities that are not really fungible335 and for problems related to 
330. Id. at 18.
331. LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT RESEARCH AT LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT RESEARCH,
http://www.epa.gov/nrmrl/lcaccess/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
332. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 292, at 8.
333. Id. at 12-14; Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333-3434 (1985). 
334. Goodstein, supra note 217, at 305-06.
335. The Wetland Mitigation Banking program in the United States is a classic
example where the commodities traded have no equivalent functions because acres 
of wetlands that are filled can be “mitigated” by the acres of wetlands created off site 
with no concern over the productivity or functions performed. Salzman, supra note 
198, at 909-10. 
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fairness in initial allocation.336  Further, many authors argue that this 
costeffectiveness is a myth because prescriptive regulation can indeed 
promote innovation and efficiency.337  Indeed, the OECD survey on economic 
instruments conducted in 1997 argues that the “ex post” evidence available 
so far cannot conclusively prove the efficiency of economic instruments over 
regulatory instruments, but in many instances economic instruments have 
proven to be effective.338  Nevertheless, the same report argues that the full 
effectiveness of economic instruments will only be fully accessed once the 
instruments have been in operation for a considerable period of time.339 
Professor David Driesen points out that the economic incentive criteria 
to differentiate these policies from the traditional command and control is 
deceptive because “traditional regulation relies upon a negative economic 
incentive — a monetary penalty for noncompliance — as the principle 
inducement to comply with regulatory requirements . . .”340  In this sense, 
environmental regulation  is all about using incentives to control 
behaviors.341  They differ, however, in regard to the type of incentive that can 
be positive or negative and the degree of economic incentive used (See 
Figure 2).   
Taking the above into consideration, it is generally agreed that all 
policies require regulation and will be influenced by economic incentives, to 
different degrees.  To the same extent that markets depend critically on how 
legal and judicial systems are set up and are monitored by governments, 
government intervention can be improved by “internal markets.”342  It is also 
well accepted that the complexity presented by ecosystem services requires 
a mixture of different policies where the optimal combination is context-
specific.  In the past few years, Payments for Ecosystem Services  emerged 
as an ally in this battle against ecosystem services loss.  Justified under the 
336. Plater et al., supra note 135, at 712-34.
337. Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command and Control Efficient?
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for 
Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887, 936 (1999); Salzman & Thompson, supra 
note 291, at 47.  In some cases, prescriptive regulation may provide more overall 
economic efficiency than its incentive-based counterpart. See Richards, supra note 
288, at 225-26. 
338. Smith, Vos & OECD, supra note 298, at 127.
339. Id. at 128.
340. Driesen, supra note 326, at 323.
341. Timothy Malloy, Regulating by Incentive: Myths, Models, and Micromarkets, 80
TEX. L. REV. 531, 531 (2002). 
342. Landell-Mills & Porras, supra note 219, at 3.
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“beneficiary pays” principle rather than the “polluter pays” principle,343, 344 
PES is an incentive-based mechanism that uses positive incentives to 
internalize positive externalities, presenting either a Coasean/Private 
agreement345 or a public subsidy characteristic depending on the scheme.346  
Although PES can be made through ecosystem markets, they do not 
necessarily require an actual market to be traded, and most often lack all 
tools and principles that characterize a market transaction.347  Therefore, 
although they resemble other policy tools, PES is something new in the big 
pool of well tested environmental approaches and presents unique 
characteristics that justify a set of principles and guidelines to be tested on 
its own terms.348  Instead of presupposing the existence of win-win solutions, 
it is a policy mechanism that explicitly recognizes hard trade-offs in land use 
options and tries to reconcile conflicting interests.349  
There is a lot of confusion about the concept and the elements of PES 
since the term has been used as a broad umbrella for any kind of market-
based mechanism adopted for conservation.350  According to Wunder, PES is 
the most promising innovation in conservation since the Earth Summit was 
held in 1992 in Rio, but it still needs to be tested on a larger and more 
343. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD),
Paying for Biodiversity: Enhancing the Cost-Effectiveness of Payments for Ecosystem Services 27 
(2010). 
344. Nevertheless, the characterization of a provider of services rather than a
polluter remains one of the most controversial and difficult issues because the harm 
prevented and the benefit derived represent two sides of the same coin. Which 
principle to apply and therefore which policy adopt — reward or punishment — is 
the core of policy design, and the situation on which PES is best suited is explored in 
this paper. 
345. Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, supra note 205, at 666; Salzman, supra note 198,
at 884 (framing PES much like a business transaction between willing parties). 
346. Salzman states that PES might also take the form of a subsidy, either as a
direct payment or a tax break, justified by an argument that, although society at a 
large benefits from them, they are not paid for due to a market failure (public good 
characteristics). See Salzman, supra note 199, at 138. See also Engel, Pagiola & 
Wunder, supra note 205, at 668 (referring to PES as a subsidy from the perspective of 
PES recipients). 
347. Salzman, supra note 199, at 135-36; Roldan Muradian et al., Reconciling
Theory and Practice: An Alternative Conceptual Framework for Understanding Payments for 
Environmental Services, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1202, 1205 (2010). 
348. Wunder, supra note 23, at 4.
349. Id. at 1; Wunder, supra note 286, at 49.
350. Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, supra note 205, at 664.
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diverse scale.351  How does PES fit within the policy toolkit?  What are the 
basic features of PES?  Under which circumstances is PES an appropriate 
policy?  What are the potentials to be explored and concerns to be 
addressed?  The next chapters will address these questions. 
D. Historic development of Payments for Ecosystem
Services
Although the recognition of the role played by ecosystems in life 
support systems has been acknowledged since antiquity, they were either 
ignored or undervaluated by the general public.  Although the idea that 
nature’s functions benefit human societies has already been investigated in 
the literature,352 the terminology ecosystem services was first adopted in the 
report STUDY OF CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1970) and explored by 
the work of Mooney and Ehrlich between 1970 and 1983.353  In the same 
period, the discipline of ecological economics354 studies was initiated.355  In 
the economic realm, this gradual recognition of the role and value rendered 
by natural structures and functions was part of a gradual commodification 
process of ecosystem services, where they were attributed an exchange 
value, rather than only a use value.356  In 1997 the seminal book “Nature’s 
Services,” by Gretchen Daily, introduced the theory of ecosystem services 
into the mainstream of environmental studies,357 and the release of the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2003 was a milestone and an eye-
351. Wunder, supra note 23, at 3.
352. Erik Gómez-Baggethun, supra note 34.
353. Mooney & Ehrlich, supra note 15, at 14-15.
354. The first academic community to specialize in this field was the Society of
Environmental and Resource Economics, whose origins date from the 1960s.  This 
society split in the 1980s between the Environmental Economics and the Ecological 
Economics.  How exactly they differ remains controversial, but one area of 
controversy is related to the sustainability of natural capital.  While environmental 
economics advocate the “weak sustainability” approach, which assumes 
substitutability between natural and manufactured capital, ecological economics 
advocates “strong sustainability” which maintains that natural capital and 
manufactured capital are in relation of complementarily rather than of one of 
substitutability.  Another area of controversy is related to ecosystem services 
valuation where ecological economists argue that different types of value may not be 
expressed in a common measurement unit. Gómez-Baggethun et al., supra note 329. 
355. See Chapter 5 and Thompson, supra note 291.
356. Gómez-Baggethun et al., supra note 329.
357. Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 11, at 6.
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opener for their value and threats, introducing the concept in the policy 
agenda.358 
The concept of ecosystem services was initially conceived as a 
communication tool to demonstrate how the disturbance of ecosystem 
functions negatively affects critical services for human beings, but it was 
promptly adopted by academics and policymakers.359  As a result, the idea of 
using payments as an economic-based policy was adopted as a corollary 
pragmatic tool to incorporate the value of ecosystem services into the 
decision-making process.  Coasean proponents integrated the concept into 
market-based mechanisms in order to address the problem of externalities 
posed by most ecosystem services.360  Consequently, Markets for Ecosystem 
Services (“MES”) and Payments for Ecosystem Services (“PES”) were 
developed as policy mechanisms to cash in on these services on market 
exchanges.361   
As several schemes were introduced and tested it became more 
evident how the complexity and scope of ecosystem services limit the 
development of markets.362  As critical analyses were developed to assess the 
impacts of such markets on poor people,363 a second generation of PES 
started to be built which incorporated lessons learned from previous 
schemes.  Given that a too broad definition did not provide elements to 
clearly distinguish PES from other economic incentive initiatives, the initial 
concept was reframed.364  
E. Conceptual Framework and Classification
There is a substantial and continuing diversity in the conceptualization 
of payments for ecosystem services, where some criteria are broader and 
358. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra note 2.
359. Gómez-Baggethun et al., supra note 329.
360. Muradian et al., supra note 353, at 1209.
361. Gómez-Baggethun et al., supra note 329.
362. Influential publications in the area of PES can be attributed to Barton H.
Thompson Jr., James Salzman, Paul Ferraro and Agnes Kiss, Natasha Landell-Mills 
and Ina Porras, Sven Wunder, Stefano Pagiola, and J. B. Ruhl. 
363. Landell-Mills & Porras, supra note 219.
364. Ina Porras et al., All that Glitters: a Review of Payments for Watershed Services in
Developing Countries 10, Natural Resource Issues No. 11. International Institute for 
Environment and Development. London, U.K. (2008). 
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encompass a wide number of arrangements while others are stricter.365  
There is also a considerable difference between the theory and the practice 
of ecosystem services, as political and cultural realities have a major 
influence on the design of the schemes.366  Different terms were used in the 
literature to describe the same or similar arrangements,367 but eventually 
PES became the most widely used expression.368  Regarding watershed 
services, the most common expression used is Payments for Watershed 
Services (“PWS”), and the latest comprehensive report on the issue defines it 
as “any transaction where there is a payment or exchange of credits between 
a buyer and seller to affect some improvement of a watershed service.”369  
Since the ideas presented in this section apply to both PES and PWS, the 
term PES will be adopted as encompassing PWS, unless otherwise noted.   
In their pioneer review of markets for environmental services, Landell-
Mills and Porras defined PES as “any situation where there was a buyer and 
a seller of an environmental service.”370  This definition was later reviewed by 
Porras in the follow-up report and slightly modified to adopt part of the five 
criteria provided by Wunder.371  Indeed, Wunder’s definition is the most 
accepted and cited372 and came to fill the gap existing in the literature at that 
time.373  Wunder describes PES as “a voluntary transaction where a well 
defined ES [environmental service] is being bought by a ES buyer, from a ES 
365. Id. at 101.  But see also Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, supra note 205, at 664,
(the broad use of the term is a strategic approach adopted by donors and NGOs to 
“sell” the projects since the expression “PES” is fashionable). 
366. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 101.
367. Apart from the discussion between “ecosystem” and “environmental”
services, there is also another discussion as to the nature of the payments or 
rewards.  The terms used are: Payments for Environmental Services, Markets for 
Environmental Services, Compensation for Environmental Services, and Rewards for 
Environmental Services.  See Wunder, supra note 23, at 5. 
368. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 10.
369. Tracy Stanton et al., State of Watershed Payments: An Emerging Marketplace 2,
http://moderncms.ecosystemmarketplace.com/repository/moderncms_documents/st
ate_of_water_2010.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2010). 
370. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 10.
371. The author considers Wunder’s five criteria too restrictive, adopting
instead three criteria: 1) an environmental externality addressed through a payment; 
2) a voluntary agreement in principle, in the supply side, and 3) conditionality in
principle. Porras et al., see id. at 14-16.
372. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 664; Arild Vatn, An
Institutional Analysis of Payments for Environmental Services, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1245 
(2010); OECD, supra note 320, at 27. 
373. Wunder, supra note 23, at 3.
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provider, if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision.”374  According to 
Wunder, five criteria must be in place to have a PES scheme, namely: 1) 
voluntary transaction; 2) well defined service; 3) buyer; 4) seller; 5) 
conditionality.  As Wunder points out, very few PES schemes analyzed by 
Landell-Mills and Porras375 meet these five criteria, so he labels those 
schemes where the five criteria are found as “true PES” and  those schemes 
where the five criteria are not found as merely “PES-like.”376  Nevertheless, he 
argues that it is desirable to convert the latter into the former because these 
five criteria represent the PES principles and must be applied when testing 
the cases.377  Muradian et al. argue that this definition is based on the Coase 
Theorem and does not reflect the bulk of PES being practiced.378  As a result, 
this mismatch between theory and practice leads to a flawed concept.379  The 
authors argue that the transactions are not voluntary from the buyer’s point 
of view, environmental services are not fully designed, and many cases in 
developing countries fail to meet the additionality criteria.380  Consequently, 
the authors propose that PES should be defined as “a transfer of resources 
between social actors, which aims to create incentives to align individual 
and/or collective land use decisions with the social interest in the 
management of natural resources.”381  Since several schemes fit within this 
classification, they could be clustered according to the importance of the 
economic incentive, the directness of the transfer, and the degree of 
commodification of environmental service.382 
The large number and diversity of the so-called PES schemes currently 
being practiced drives confusion and different conceptualizations. 
Nevertheless, PES as an optional policy is a topic field which requires 
coherent analysis and application.  This is easier said than done when one 
takes into account the novelty of the policy and the complexity of the 
subject.  However, as observed by Ann Althouse: “Finding a scheme of 
374. Id.
375. Id. at 4; Landell-Mills and Ina Porras, supra note 219.
376. Wunder, supra note 23, at 4.
377. Id. at 4, 21.
378. According to this theorem, “as long as transaction costs are low enough
and property rights are clearly defined, individuals, communities and even supra-
national entities would trade away their rights until a Pareto-efficient provision of 
environmental goods and services has been achieved.” Muradian et al., supra note 
353, at 1203. 
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 1205.
382. Id.
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coherence, a framework, really is the process of understanding.  To merely 
observe that a field is chaotic, arcane or incoherent is to decline the work of 
understanding.”383  In order to make the analyses consistent, it is critical to 
classify the subject, identifying common and distinctive patterns. 
Considering that the definition should be a function of the policy’s goal, 
containing what is common and distinctive to other policies, the concept of 
PES could be described as a positive incentive to protect or improve an 
ecosystem service conditional to the delivery of the service.   
Using a carrot, or positive incentive, as a key feature PES is 
differentiated from other policies that adopt coercion or negative economic 
incentives to drive behaviors.  The ultimate goal of the policy is to address 
an environmental positive externality that is common to the provision of 
most ecosystem services, therefore aiming to protect or enhance the 
delivery of these services that are threatened precisely by its character of 
positive externality.  Either because many PES that are being practiced 
around the world are not conditional to the delivery of the service or 
because the actual delivery is hard to measure, the conditionality is the 
most controversial feature of this policy.  Nevertheless, “conditionality is 
critical to the definition of PES.”384  Otherwise, there would be no distinction 
between government-financed PES and subsidies.  In addition, because the 
policy goal is to protect or enhance ecosystem services, without genuine 
mechanisms that at least attempt to demonstrate delivery, there will be no 
means to ensure the policy is effectiveor efficient.   
F. Key Elements
1. Positive incentives
Ferraro and Kiss described payments for watershed protection as an 
incentive to preserve ecosystems, situated in the middle of the spectrum of 
tools to promote conservation and considered a more direct approach than 
subsidies for sustainable agriculture (and therefore distinct of subsidies) but 
less direct than easements and more effective than indirect approaches such 
as ICDP.385  Wunder classifies PES as a policy that most relies on economic 
incentives when compared to other policies, presenting more directness in 
conservation than environmental taxes and subsidies, which also rely 
383. Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 993, 1001 (1994), cited in Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: an 
Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 229-30 (2010). 
384. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 668.
385. Ferraro and Kiss, supra note 322.
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heavily on economic incentives.386  PES is situated in the northern cluster of 
the figure below:  
FIGURE 2: 
Degrees of Economic Incentive and Directness* 
a. Voluntary Transaction
Wunder classifies PES as a voluntary agreement in opposition to 
command-and-control measures and stresses that, where providers have no 
land use choice, the payment is not voluntary but rather is part of a 
command-and control approach.387  Muradian et al. strongly oppose this 
characterization, arguing that “a wide variety of schemes depend on State 
engagement and therefore are not voluntary market transactions from the 
buyer’s point of view” and argue that, in many other cases, the buyers are 
not aware of actually paying for ecosystem services when they are charged 
for higher water fees.388  So the question is, which characteristics should a 
policy present so as to be classified as a voluntary approach? 
Seen as a natural evolution of conventional prescriptive command and 
control, voluntary agreements were introduced into the public policy debate 
386. Wunder, supra note 23, at 7.
* Wunder, supra note 23, at 6.
387. Id. at 3.
388. Muradian et al., supra note 353, at 1203.
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as a means to achieve environmental targets by negotiated agreements.389  
The host of benefits propagated by voluntary agreement advocates includes 
more flexibility in achieving the environmental goal, more political support, 
and reduced conflict between governments and the regulated community 
since a consensus is sought.390  At the same time, critics characterize 
voluntary agreements as wishful thinking and argue that they can lead to 
inferior policy results.391  Voluntary agreements can be made through three 
different main instruments: (a) unilateral commitments made by polluters 
and communicated to their stakeholders; (b) negotiated agreements 
between elements of one sector or group of sectors to meet one or more 
overall targets; and (c) public voluntary schemes developed by 
environmental agencies, according to standards or targets set by public 
authorities.392  While voluntary approaches provide more flexibility in terms 
of how to meet the environmental target, setting the appropriate level is 
vital for the effectiveness of this policy.393  To the same extent, this flexibility 
raises issues related to regulatory capture.  Since environmental targets 
tend to be set for individual companies or sectors, rather than applied on a 
large scale, economic efficiency tends to be low and the costs to negotiate, 
prepare, and implement the agreement tend to be high.394  Nevertheless, 
without a credible stick, voluntary agreements are unlikely to add any 
contribution to the policy toolkit.   
Adopting these definitions, PES schemes can fit within negotiated 
agreements between elements of one sector or group of sectors to meet one 
or more overall targets or within public voluntary schemes developed by 
environmental agencies.  It is unlikely that they will resemble unilateral 
commitments made by polluters and communicated to their stakeholders 
because here the goal is not to reward a positive externality and the carrot is 
not a reward of cash or in kind.  As seen, the common and distinctive feature 
389. Dorit Kerret and Alon Tal, Greenwash or Green Gain? Predicting the Success and
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Environmental Voluntary Agreements, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 
31, 32 (2005). 
390. Id. at 32-34.
391. Id. at 34.
392. Environmental Voluntary Approaches: Research Insights for Policy Makers, CENTRE 
D’ECONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE (CERNA),  6 (Charles J. Higley & Francois Leveque eds., 2001) 
http://www.cerna.mines-paristech.fr/Documents/FLCJH-CAVAPolicyBrief.pdf.  
393. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD),
Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policy: Effectiveness, Efficiency and Usage in Policy Mixes 
PIN CITE (2003). 
394. Id.
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of PES is the positive incentive to address an externality rather than a 
voluntary approach policy.   
b. Subsidies
Salzman and Wunder usually refer to government-financed PES as a 
subsidy.395  All subsidies are, by definition, voluntary but not all 
environmental voluntary approaches adopted in policy making are 
subsidies.396  The opt-in characteristics of PES make them voluntary 
agreements but, as seen, voluntariness as a key feature is not the 
distinctiveness of PES.  Accordingly, are they subsidies?  
For a long time and not without reason, subsidies have been linked to 
environmental degradation and have faced political opposition.  The 
political and institutional obstacles for the use of subsidies can include but 
are not limited to: (a) no subsidy can be a good subsidy; once a new subsidy 
is in place, it will be very difficult to remove it later and therefore is better 
not to have it; (b) it is difficult to choose among competing opportunities, 
and governments are inadequate when it comes to making the choice as to 
when the markets are best suited for this task; (c) subsidies are likely to 
contravene international trade rules; and (d) subsidies are inadequate to the 
task of promoting their goals.397  Nevertheless, subsidies can also be used 
for positive environmental purposes.398 
Adopting a common and broad definition, subsidies represent “public 
payments which directly benefit the private production or consumption of 
goods and services,”399 but the literature provides varied and different 
examples which make the definition context specific.400  Nevertheless, 
subsidies usually fall within three categories: i) when governments make 
direct transfers of funds to producers or consumers or instruct private 
parties to do so; ii) when governments provide goods or services at no cost 
or below market price; or iii) when regulatory policies create transfers from 
one group to another.401  The first two categories were included in the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures definition of 
395. See supra note 323.
396. OECD, supra note 371, at 110.
397. Barg, supra note 305,at 27.
398. Id.
399. Keppler, supra note 209, at 193.
400. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report: Exploring the Links Between
Subsidies, Trade and the WTO 52 (2006). 
401. Id. at 48-49.
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subsidies,402 but the most widespread, standardized information on 
subsidies is provided by the National Accounts Statistics, which defines 
subsidy as “current unrequited payments that government units make to 
enterprises on the basis of the level of their production activities or the 
quantities or values of the services which they produce, sell or import.”403  
Although this definition restricts subsidies to the first category listed 
above,404 it would not exclude PES if it were not for the conditionality 
element.  Since subsidies are unrequited, meaning that no contribution is 
expected or received in return,405 they are distinct from PES which are 
conditional, despite having many elements of subsidization.  Engel et al., 
also stress that subsidies can suffer from lack of additionality and leakage,406 
elements that are necessarily required in a PES.  As seen, the unique 
features of PES confer to them an individual place in the policy toolkit. 
c. Drivers
Watershed protection usually has two general purposes: to secure or 
enhance instream flow and/or to reduce pollution.  Water quality and 
quantity are usually classified as public goods, turning them into a 
government concern,407 but they may also present private good or common 
good characteristics,408 driving the private sector to step in.   
The private sector usually engages in a PES scheme in order to secure 
the delivery of a service in a more cost-effective way when compared to the 
provision without the PES scheme or to secure the delivery of a service that 
is threatened otherwise.409  Governmental regulation is a substantial driver 
of payments for watershed protection,410 and certainly regulation is the 
major driver of the Water Quality Trading scheme in the United States.411  
402. World Trade Organization Analytical Index: Guide to World Trade
Organization Law and Practice, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,  art. 1, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/subsidies_ 
01_e.htm 
403. World Trade Organization, supra note 378, at 51.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, supra note 205, at 668.
407. Thompson, supra note 31, at 293-94.
408. Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, supra note 205, at 667.
409. FOREST TRENDS ET AL., PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: GETTING STARTED: A
PRIMER 33 (2008). 
410. Id. at 36.
411. Stanton et al., supra note 347, at 51.
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Regulation was also the trigger to what became the worldwide famous NYC 
Watershed Agreement. 
d. The New York City Watershed Agreement
The best known example of payments for watershed protection in the 
U.S. is the agreement that involved New York City and several municipalities 
in upstate New York to protect the city’s drinking water supplies and avoid 
the construction of a filtration system.  In 1989, the Safe Drinking Water Act 
and the Surface Water Treatment Rule released by the EPA set the stage for 
what would be one of the largest payment schemes for watershed 
protection.412  According to the rule, any water system using waters from 
reservoirs, streams, lakes, and rivers would have to filter those waters unless 
they could obtain an exemption.413  The waiver would be issued for those 
who could demonstrate that they would be able to protect the water bodies 
from contaminants.  The strategy to protect the watershed and avoid the 
construction of a costly filtration plant (not always proven to be effective) 
involved land acquisition, regulation restricting development, and payments 
for ecosystem services.414  The whole watershed protection program was 
estimated to cost about $1.5 billion, far less than the $4 billion to $8 billion 
cost of constructing a filtration plant.415  Obviously, the path to the 1997 New 
York City watershed agreement was not smooth.  First, there was a huge 
outcry from upstate landowners and municipalities regarding the 
restrictions imposed on future development.  Second, to make the health 
and environmental department of New York City push the issue more 
aggressively, officials were targets of several law suits and media attention, 
led by Robert Kennedy Jr. on behalf of Riverkeepers and sponsored by the 
Pace University School of Law Environmental Litigation Clinic.416  It is worth 
pointing out that the historic regulatory authority of New York City over 
activities in the watershed provided this agreement with unique 
characteristics that may not be replicated in other settings.417  Nevertheless, 
the 1997 memorandum of agreement was made possible due to, among 
other things, extensive negotiations that included several payments for 
watershed protection. 
412. GRETCHEN C. DAILY & KATHERINE ELLISON, THE NEW ECONOMY OF NATURE: THE
QUEST TO MAKE CONSERVATION PROFITABLE 69 (2002). 
413. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (b)(7)(C)(i)(v); 40 C.F.R. § 141.71.
414. Thompson, supra note 31, at 301-04.
415. Id. at 299.
416. Daily & Allison, supra note 390, at 70-71.
417. Thompson, supra note 31, at 301.
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Another common reason for engaging in this type of agreement is to 
secure value added to output goods and services and improved public 
relations.418  Companies that finance PES schemes are usually motivated by 
the desire to improve their relationships with the local community and to 
give public notice of their environmental consciousness.  By doing so, they 
can both attract the same sort of consumers, thereby increasing their market 
share as well as charging a premium for their products or services. 
e. Service Buyers
All users of the services identified in subsection “Freshwater 
Ecosystem Services” (Part II subsection C) are potential buyers of ecosystem 
services, namely: hydroelectric power producers, water treatment facilities, 
industrial (particularly food and drink, drugs, cosmetics, energy, and mining 
industries), agricultural, transportation and tourism sector, and even 
individuals.  Where it is viable to identify users and make them pay for the 
service, then we have a user-financed program.  Users will be likely to 
engage in a PES scheme when either (a) the scheme benefits a small 
number of actors so the transaction costs and incentives for freeriding are 
low or (b) if users have sufficiently large benefits that justify bearing all the 
costs and freeriding on the effort of others would be an unrealistic option.419  
An example of the latter situation would be the benefits accrued by 
hydroelectric power plants that justify the payments despite others 
potentially being able to freeride on the same benefits.420  Therefore, the 
conditions required for the implementation of a user-financed scheme are 
related to i) property rights clearly defined and enforced, ii) low transaction 
costs, or iii) situations with local monopsonies or oligopsonies because they 
tend to lower the transaction costs and override the freerider and collective 
action problem.421  These programs are considered user-financed programs, 
as opposed to government-financed programs, where governments not only 
pay the bill but also have the authority and discretion to make the 
agreement and the payments.422  According to Salzman, monopsonies 
explain part of the success of PES introduced in the U.S. based New York 
418. OECD, supra note 320, at 86-87.
419. Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, supra note 205, at 667.
420. Id.
421. Id. Salzman, however, points out to the potential danger of bid-rigging
through collusion when there are few providers.  See Salzman, supra note 199, at 920. 
422. Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, supra note 205, at 666.
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Watershed Agreement, the Australian based Bush Tender, and Costa Rican 
program known as FONAFIFO.423  
Additionally, there are still hybrid programs which are financed 
primarily from governments funds but also include payments from service 
users.424 
Apart from user and government-financed schemes, some PES are 
funded totally or partially by donors, at least in terms of the start up costs. 
Start up costs include the costs of assessing the provisions of ecosystem 
services and their values, designing the scheme, identifying prospective 
buyers and sellers, and negotiating and closing the deal,425 and may 
represent a substantial portion of the transaction costs.  Donors are usually 
NGOs, International Financial Institutions426 and private investors.427  
Significant amounts of financial aid were given by these institutions for PES 
in developing countries; however, that aid was not intended to be 
permanent, but was rather meant to cover the costs of the transition to 
improved practices.428 
Although public payments can scale up more quickly and benefit from 
economies of scale, they are believed to be less targeted, less efficient429 and 
less sustainable than user-financed programs.430  Sustainability is a recurring 
concern cited by some critics of PES, who argue that PES schemes are 
unsustainable because they require ongoing financial commitments.431  
However, the very reason payments were introduced was to compensate for 
a positive externality because the activity of protecting or enhancing 
ecosystem services was not rewarded by other means.  As Ferraro and Kiss 
point out, “like the legendary Holy Grail, however, the self-financing 
423. Salzman, supra note 199, at 903.
424. Sven Wunder, Stefanie Engel and Stefano Pagiola, Taking Stock: A
Comparative Analysis of Payments for Environmental Services Programs in Developed and 
Developing Countries, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 834 (2008). 
425. OECD, supra note 320, at 72; Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 39.
426. The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) biodiversity mainstreaming
portfolio includes more than thirty projects that apply PES. See OECD, supra note 32, 
at 73. 
427. Private investors have the alternative to buy green bonds issued by
governments, IFI, insurance companies, or private investment companies. See id., at 
73-75.
428. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 45.
429. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408.
430. OECD, supra note 320, at 76.
431. J. A. Swart, Will Direct Payments Help Biodiversity?  299 SCI. 1981 (2003), cited
in Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408. 
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conservation activity is elusive” and other policies adopted for conservation 
also require a sustained flow of funds over time.432  Ideally, user-financed 
programs are likely to provide reliable and sustainable PES financing, as far 
as the ecosystem service is effectively delivered. However, due to the 
limitations previously identified, mobilizing user finance is not always 
possible.  In such circumstances, leverage funds via taxes and fees can be 
appropriate.433 
f. Potential Providers
Sellers can be private landowners, indigenous communities, protected 
areas, land trusts, NGOs, and, in some circumstances, informal stewards or 
whoever has de facto land use control over the targeted area.434  The unique 
characteristics of watershed services compel negotiation with the landholder 
located in the water supply area, and allow less flexibility in choosing 
service providers.  While many schemes compel de jure land rights, PES do 
not necessarily require it, as long as the informal landowner whose claims 
are widely recognized and respected has the “right to exclude” others.435  In 
practice, however, insecure land tenure usually entails conflicts and weak 
control over the parcel of land.  This topic raises the issue of who should be 
paid for the forgone opportunity cost.  Wunder argues that for a PES scheme 
to be politically acceptable a critical mass of decisionmakers must be 
compensated.436  This critical mass may involve those who can make site-
specific claims over the area, communities acting as effective direct local 
guardians, and local governments recently strengthened by decentralization 
and oversight.437  At the end of the day, “[w]hom exactly to pay is a question 
of negotiation, political feasibility, legality — and possibly also of ethics, 
since some actors may lose illegal revenues, corrupt payoffs, and iniquitous 
profits.”438  
As the objective of PES is to protect or improve an ecosystem service 
and the cost-effectiveness of the program recommends payments for those 
who can provide greater additionality, “the ideal seller of environmental 
432. Ferraro and Kiss, supra note 322, at 1719.
433. OECD, supra note 320, at 87.
434. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 667.
435. Wunder, supra note 23, at 14.
436. Id. at 13.
437. Id. at 14.
438. Id.
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services is, if not outright environmentally nasty, then at least at the edge of 
becoming so.”439  
g. Cash vs. In kind
Payments can be made in cash or in kind.  There are also programs 
where training, technical assistance and other forms of capacity building 
were transferred in addition to, or in some cases, instead of, financial 
payments.440  In their survey, conducted in several developed and developing 
countries, Wunder et al. found that all payments were based implicitly or 
explicitly on the cost of service provision rather than on the value of the 
service provided.441  Payments in cash are more appropriate when providers 
lose cash from the foregone opportunity cost, although there is a debate 
whether cash can effectively be used for poverty alleviation or whether it can 
cause social distress.442  Based on a case study conducted in Bolivia 
comparing in kind (beehives) and cash transfer, Wunder perceived 
advantages and disadvantages to each model but concluded that the 
beehive mode was more likely to support psychological studies which argue 
that low-value in kind payments can be more effective than low-value cash 
payments, because recipients are more likely to view in kind transfers as 
compatible with reciprocal exchange and social markets.443  Nevertheless, 
the author argues that the preferences and effectiveness vary among 
individuals and communities and, therefore, a customized approach is 
desirable.444  
2. To Protect or Improve an Ecosystem Service
In theory, any payment related to the delivery of services identified in 
the four groups described above in subsection “Freshwater Ecosystem 
Services” can be transacted.  In practice, due to the challenges in translating 
ecosystem services into a commodity that can be the subject of a contract, 
only four types of ecosystem services have been negotiated to date: carbon 
sequestration, biodiversity protection, watershed protection and protection 
of landscape beauty.445  For watershed protection, the goal is usually water 
439. Wunder, supra note 286, at 53.
440. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 82.
441. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408, at 841.
442. Wunder, supra note 23, at 15.
443. Id. at 16.
444. Id.
445. Wunder, supra note 286, at 49.
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quality, quantity  or both.446  It is generally accepted that land-use 
management practices can affect the provision of watershed services, 
although there is disagreement as regards to extent and nature of the 
effects.447  The agreements negotiated usually involve the adoption of 
agricultural, forest and stream best management practices (BMPs), as well 
as reforestation, conservation, and rehabilitation of existing ecosystems.448  
The list of BMPs commonly adopted are buffers and setbacks, alternatives to 
slash-and-burn, soil conservation techniques and grazing practices, 
pesticides management, stream bank fencing to keep animals out of 
waterways, and erosion-preventing forestry strategies, depending on 
whether the riparian area is in a rural or an urban setting.449  Engel et al., 
point out that programs involving changes in land use, such as 
reforestation, tend to be more expensive than programs that focus on 
protecting existing land uses, such as preserving existing forests.450  It must 
also be stressed that some land uses such as reforestation, which provide a 
specific ecosystem service like carbon sequestration, might be harmful for 
the delivery of other services such as biodiversity.  The loss of biodiversity 
might increase pest and diseases, requiring the use of pesticides which can 
negatively impact waterbodies and soil.  
As already mentioned, PES were introduced as a policy mechanism to 
protect or enhance ecosystem services.  However, since ecosystem services 
are usually provided over the long term, and since much uncertainty remains 
regarding the links between structures and functions, policy designers must 
deduce what would hypothetically happen without the PES intervention. 
The baseline is essentially the business-as-usual trend in ecosystem service 
provision in the absence of the PES.451  As a result, the choice of the 
appropriate baseline is crucial, because adopting the wrong baseline can 
either lower the PES efficiency or result in a waste of money.452  In this 
regard, three types of baseline can be adopted: a) Static Baseline, where the 
service provision is assumed to remain constant without the payment 
446. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 29.
447. Id. at 7.
448. Id. at 34-37.
449. For a list of BMPs adopted in the United States to address storm-water
runoff in urbanized areas, EPA maintains a Web site with a national menu of BMPs. 
See http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/menuofbmps/ (Last visited on Dec. 16, 
2010). 
450. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 667-668.
451. OECD, supra note 320, at 50.
452. Wunder, supra note 23, at 9.
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intervention; b) Declining Baseline, where the service provision is assumed to 
decline over time, and any action to halt its deterioration is considered 
additional; c) Improving Baseline, where the service provision is assumed to 
improve over time even without specific interventions453.  These types of 
baselines can be visualized in the graphics below. 
FIGURE 3: 
Baseline Types* 
In the case of PES, and PWS in particular, it is unlikely that policy 
makers will adopt an improving baseline to establish and evaluate the 
efficiency of the payment scheme, because the rate of biodiversity and 
453. Id. at 8-9.
* Sven Wunder, PAYMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: SOME NUTS AND BOLTS,
CIFOR OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 42, (2005) at 9, Figure 2. 
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ecosystem degradation and loss are undeniable.454  The choice will fall 
between a static and a deteriorating baseline, and must be based on a 
context-specific analysis. 
a. Additionality
As demonstrated in the figure above, additionality implies a greater 
aggregate effect of an input into another existing input.455  The concept of 
additionality in environmental policy was largely debated and explored as 
one of the preconditions for Clean Development Mechanism Projects (“CDM 
Projects”) — one of the flexible mechanisms established by the Kyoto 
Protocol and also required in the voluntary carbon market.  
b. Additionality in Carbon Offset Projects
Additionality is considered the most important and controversial 
requirement in a carbon offset project and, to assess it, some tests were 
developed.  Under the Legal and Regulated Additionality Test, “if the project is 
implemented to fulfill official policies, regulations, or industry standards, it 
cannot be considered additional.”456  If other legal obligations would lead to 
the reduction achieved in that particular project, then it fails the 
additionality test.  Under the Financial or Investment Test, “the revenue from the 
carbon offsets must be a decisive reason for implementing a project.”457  In 
other words, if the project’s rate of return is attractive enough without 
considering the project, it is not additional.  To pass the Common Practice Test, 
the project must show that it does not employ technologies that are already 
commonly used.  Some standards still might require the Barrier Test, which 
demands that the project must succeed in overcoming nonfinancial barriers 
that the business-as-usual alternative would not have had to face, such as 
local resistance or lack of know-how.458  Most of the controversy surrounding 
454. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra note 2.
455. Additionality as defined by the Business Dictionary: Extent to which a
new input (action or item) adds to the existing inputs (instead of replacing any of 
them) and results in a greater aggregate.  Additionality Definition, Business 
Dictionary.com http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/additionality.html 
(Last visited on Dec. 16, 2010).  
456. Anja Kollmuss, Helge Zink, Clifford Polycarp, Making Sense of the Voluntary
Carbon Market: A Comparison of Carbon Offset Standards 15 (2008). Available online at 
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additionality in CDM projects is due to the fear that if the projects are not 
truly additional, and the credits generated by them will be used to offset 
emissions somewhere else, then the aggregate effect will be higher GHG 
emissions.  The scenario is different for PWS, and new methodologies must 
be developed to assess additionality. 
Considering that the ultimate goal of PES is to obtain or improve 
service provision, the targeted activity should be one that can provide 
greater additionality over the baseline, in order to avoid expending money 
for nothing, which would be inefficient.459  This efficiency, however, raises 
issues of equity that are explored in below in subsection I.  However, what 
must certainly be avoided is to turn payments for ecosystem services into 
perverse subsidies,460 thereby rewarding service providers for worsening the 
services they provide in expectation of future payments and, therefore, 
making PES unwittingly reward the very behavior they are trying to 
suppress.461  Setting the appropriate baseline in a reasonable period prior to 
the design of the program can help avoid this problem.462  
c. Leakage
Leakage refers to the inadvertent displacement of target damaging 
activities to areas outside the geographical zone where the PES scheme is 
being applied.463  The leakage of the damaging activity to an area outside the 
project zone results in a nil or even negative protection and enhancement of 
the service in the whole, which is the opposite of the policy goal.  In 
addition, it overestimates the environmental benefits that accrue from 
PES.464  Ferraro and Kiss in their study of payments to conserve biodiversity 
expressed concern over leakage in payment schemes although they also 
stated that it is a problem that applies equally to more indirect approaches 
459. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 670.
460. Perverse subsidies are those that are detrimental to both the
environment and the economy in the long run. Some subsidies might be positive for 
the first field and negative or neutral for the later and vice versa.  See Norman Meyers 
and Jennifer Kent, Perverse Subsidies: How Tax Dollars Can Undercut the Environment and the 
Economy 22 (2001).  Perverse subsidies can increase the profits of damaging activities 
and increase the opportunity costs of activities that are alternative to the production 
of ecosystem services.  See OECD, supra note 320, at 48.  A classical example would be 
subsidies to develop agriculture and therefore, expand the local economy but 
produce excessive and unsustainable water withdrawal and biodiversity loss. 
461. Salzman, supra note 198, at 145; Wunder, supra note 286, at 57.
462. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 668.
463. Id. at 670.
464. Id. at 671.
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to address conservation, such as ICDPs.465  Leakage is usually more a 
concern for global projects such as carbon sequestration, and less a concern 
in localized services like watershed services when the whole watershed is 
included in the project.466   
If leakage presents a potential risk in a project, the monitoring 
framework can be extended to areas outside the geographic boundaries of 
the PES scheme and some safeguard measures can be adopted, such as 
penalties for land use changes implemented in areas within the community 
but outside the project.467  These additional measures, however, might 
increase the transaction costs, and must be weighed against the risks and 
magnitude of the leakage.468 
d. Permanence
Permanence refers to the ability of the scheme to ensure sustained 
provision of the services over the long-term.469  Critics of PES argue that 
once the payments have ceased, permanence will be hindered.470  However, 
the very reason why payments were adopted is because the activity that 
protects or enhances the ecosystem service has no incentive to be adopted 
or maintained otherwise.  Therefore, “there cannot be any expectation of 
permanence in the absence of payments.”471  Permanence, therefore, should 
be a concern when landholders purposely or negligently breach the 
contract.472  To avoid this risk not only should payments cease but also 
monetary penaltiesshould be established.  
In this context, sometimes conditions change in a way that makes it 
excessively burdensome for the service provider to maintain the original 
agreement.  In this regard, one of the main advantages of PES is that they 
are flexible so the terms of the agreement can be renegotiated up to the 
point that the scheme is still socially efficient.473  Another situation to look 
out for is the loss of ecosystem services due to unforeseen events like fires, 
465. Ferraro and Kiss, supra note 322, at 1718.
466. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408, at 847.
467. OECD, supra note 320, at 51-52.
468. Id. at 52.
469. Id.
470. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 671, citing Swart, supra note
415. 
471. Id.
472. OECD, supra note 320, at 52.
473. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 671.
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hurricanes, or introduction of invasive species.  The allocation of 
responsibility must be clearly specified in the agreement, and when the risks 
are particularly high, setting an emergency fund or underwriting an 
insurance policy can be considered.474, 475 
e. Targeting
Finally, it is crucial that the services to be protected and enhanced are 
well identified and targeted especially when funds are insufficient to pay all 
potential providers.  Where funds for PES are limited payments for land uses 
that would have been adopted anyway reduce funds available for PES 
elsewhere.476  It might seem obvious but it is crucial to first identify which 
ecosystem service shall be protected or enhanced in order to define which 
sites and land management practices must be adopted or discouraged. 
When looking for water quality, for instance, concerns over eutrophication 
require nutrient uptake while concerns over turbidity require sediment 
retention services.477  
While some schemes make uniform payments on a per hectare basis 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the program can be enhanced by targeted 
and differentiated payments.478  Spatial mapping tools are being developed 
to identify and discern the spatial heterogeneity in ecosystem services, 
providing data to build environmental benefit indices and scores.479  
Targeting can be based not only on the individual level and value of the 
service being provided but also on the threats to which the service is 
subject, or the lowest opportunity cost,480 allowing flexible payments 
according to different individual values and costs.481  Some government-
financed programs also use poverty alleviation as a targeting criterion, 
474. OECD, supra note 320, at 52; Forest Trends, supra note 387, at 12.
475. The Carbon Market spurred a variety of insurance products ranging from
carbon credit risk products to insurance for alternative energies. Driven by new 
opportunities seem in the risk business, the insurance sector is likely to increase 
their offer of products in this field. 
476. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 670.
477. Salzman, supra note 198, at 900.
478. OECD, supra note 320, at 58.
479. They are: the UNEP-WCMC Carbon and Biodiversity Demonstration Atlas,
Artificial Intelligence for Ecosystem Services (ARIES), Integrated Valuation of 
Ecosystem Services and Trade-offs (InVEST), and SENSOR.  See id. at 60. 
480. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 671.
481. Id.
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although PES was not originally designed for this end result.482  While 
targeting payments based on level and type of service provision is likely to 
be more effective (and efficient), determining the exact level of service 
required and how much it should be rewarded is the greatest challenge, due 
to the complexity of ecosystem services and the high transaction costs 
thereto.483  Whereas this approach might improve efficiency, it must be 
weighed against associated additional transaction costs.484   
When faced with budget constraints, which is a common reality 
everywhere, targeted PES may lead to making fewer payments, or no 
payments at all, to those who have already provided or are providing the 
targeted service.  While some argue that it might be unfair, Wunder points 
out that this is not always true, because those who do not constitute a 
credible threat probably do not lose conservation opportunity costs from 
foregone development.485  
3. Conditional to the Delivery of the Service
As already mentioned, conditionality is the most controversial key 
feature of PES.  The complexity of ecosystem service dynamics, the lack of 
knowledge and weak institutions render the conditionality as the weakest 
condition to be demonstrated, and many schemes being negotiated are 
based on beliefs rather than scientific proof.  This problem is more acute in 
PWS where the scientific evidence on the linkages between land use and the 
delivery of watershed services is insufficiently strong.486  While the links 
between land use and water quality find consensus in the literature and are 
well documented, the links between land use and water quantity are more 
difficult to demonstrate.487 
Despite these challenges, “[c]onditionality is critical to the definition 
of PES”488 and must be pursued.489  When the links between land use and 
delivery of the service are well established it often should be possible to 
design appropriate PES programs.490  As Wunder points out, “the less 
482. Id. at 672.
483. Salzman, supra note 198, at 905.
484. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 671.
485. Wunder, supra note 23, at 12.
486. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 89.
487. Id. at 90.
488. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 668.
489. Ferraro and Kiss, supra note 322, at 1718.
490. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408 at at 846.
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realistic the scientific basis of a PES scheme, the more exposed it is to the 
risk of buyers questioning its rationale and abandoning payments.”491  
Therefore, “user payments [and government payments as well] need to be 
truly contingent upon the service being continuously provided.”492  
a. Monitoring and Certification
For PES schemes to be conditional, it is critical to monitor them and 
verify whether the service is being delivered.  In other words, whether there 
was “additionality” over the established baseline.  In a survey that analyzed 
several PES schemes in developed and developing countries, it was argued 
that, in all cases, payments were at least nominally conditional.  In small 
user financed programs, conditionality was limited by monitoring capacity, 
and in government-financed programs, conditionality was limited by 
unwillingness to penalize noncompliance.493 Monitoring also enables 
decisionmakers to adjust and improve the design of the program over time494 
and enforce penalties whenever there is a breach of contract.495 
Ideally PES should be made upon the services effectively delivered — 
e.g., it should be output-based.496  The assessment can be based on detailed
and site-specific monitoring or “rough and ready” visual field estimates.
Whichever method is used it must take into account spatial variation and
landscape context.497  In practice, due the complexities of ecosystem services
and the time delay between the implementation of the land management
practice and the delivery of the services, PES are usually input based.498
Payments are made based on land-management practices believed to
deliver the service, measured on a per-hectare basis, on a number of trees
planted, on a quantity of invasive species cleared, or whatever is the practice
adopted.499  To evaluate additionality and discern the PES impact from
omitted variables such as recipients’ location, schooling, conservation
attitudes, etc., Wunder suggests combining implementation with research
and systematic data collection, randomly, in areas with performance
491. Wunder, supra note 23, at 3.
492. Id.
493. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408, at 842.
494. OECD, supra note 320, at 49.
495. Id. at 53.
496. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 668.
497. Salzman, supra note 198, at 906.
498. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 668.
499. Id.
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payments and in areas where there is no payment.500  Also recommended is 
assessing the socioeconomic impacts at the participant’s level, to ensure 
that the welfare of participants is improved.501 
For the conditionality to be effective many authors suggest that 
payments should be made periodically and should not involve large 
irreversible up-front benefits such as construction of infrastructure that are 
more appropriate for ICDP projects.502  Periodicity is even more crucial where 
governance is weak and monitoring is deficient.503  
G. Legal Framework
“Payment for watershed service (PWS) schemes do not operate in a 
legal, social or political vacuum.”504  Rather, they operate in the national and 
local legal framework, which might either constrain or enhance the use of 
this policy.  In some circumstances, depending on the country and context, a 
legislative change is required in order to establish a PES scheme.505  
As will be demonstrated below in section H subsection 3, PES is 
appropriate when threats to the delivery of ecosystem services constitute a 
legal and legitimate activity.  In this sense, the legal system and existing 
regulations will shape the situations in which PES can be considered an 
appropriate policy option and those situations where it is not.  According to 
500. Wunder, supra note 23, at 10.
501. OECD, supra note 320, at 49.
502. Wunder, supra note 23, at 16.
503. Id. at 4.
504. Asquith, Nigel et al., Global Experiences with Payments for Watershed Services:
Major Challenges and Solutions, Natura Bolivia/IIED/CIFOR (2008), cited in Forest Trends, 
supra note 387, at 38. 
505. In 1997, Brazil introduced a new statute regulating the national policy of
water resources — Law No. 9.433, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA União (1997). To create the 
institutional arrangements necessary to implement the new policy, and start 
charging fees for water use, another statute was enacted — Law No. 9.984, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA União  (2000). Both are available online at http://www.senado.gov.br/ 
legislacao (Last visited on Dec. 16, 2010).  These legislative changes set the stage for 
the implementation of several pilot projects for watershed protection that are under 
test in the country. See supra note 4. In 2007, a new bill, PL 792, was introduced in 
Congress regulating specifically Payments for Ecosystem Services as a new policy. 
The bill still has to be approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate 
before it became federal law. See supra note 3). 
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Salzman, despite few exceptions,506 the protection of ecosystem services by 
the law was not a primary objective during the drafting of the major and 
most relevant environmental laws in the United States.507  The Clean Water 
Act does not directly regulate nonpoint source pollution, and this absence 
makes the case for PES to be considered a cost-effective policy.508  The law 
may also act as the major driver for the adopting of PWS (see the NYC 
Watershed Agreement Case, above in section F subsection 3) through tough 
regulation on environmental standards.  Further, the law is crucial in 
defining and enforcing land tenure which, in turn, is crucial for establishing 
PES.  To establish a PES scheme rights to the land that delivers the 
environmental services, especially the right to exclude others, must be 
clarified.509  J. Börner, analyzing PES applied in the Brazilian Amazon, 
suggests that unclear or insufficient land tenure information in the area 
limits the scope and application of a REDD scheme.510 
In some circumstances, legislative changes are necessary in order to 
make possible the establishment of the agreements and the transfer of 
payments.  The legislative change usually starts with the recognition of 
ecosystem services in national or local environmental laws, although there 
are reports of payment schemes that moved forward without any change.511  
Nevertheless, it is recommended that legislative statutes contain the 
necessary management structure, and procedural, monitoring and 
enforcement provisions, to avoid setbacks when the government changes.512  
Legal provisions can be inserted in the State Constitution, in public or civil 
law, and “where legal and policy frameworks are lacking, contract law 
becomes the framework within which PES develops.”513  
Statutory requirements also make possible the charge of fees or taxes 
from resource users and the reallocation of funds from the general budget. 
This is the goal of a new law approved in Costa Rica in 2006 and it is 
506. These exceptions are the Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, sections 4
and 9 of the Endangered Species Act and the National Forest Management Act’s use 
of indicator species.  See Salzman, supra note 198, at 880-81. 
507. Id.
508. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, FN 9 at 29; PL n. 792 of 2007.  Available
online at http://www.camara.gov.br/sileg/integras/453221.pdf  (Last visited on Dec. 
12, 2010). 
509. Arild Vatn, supra note 350, at 1247-1248.
510. Jan Börner et al., Direct Conservation Payments in the Brazilian Amazon: Scope
and Equity Implications, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1272, 1281 (2010). 
511. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 48-50.
512. Id. at 50-51.
513. Forest Trends, supra note 387, at 38.
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expected that these funds will be channeled to PWS.514  The same 
mechanism was used in Brazil when the Law 9.984 was enacted in 2000.  
Overall, the law has the power to drive social norms and force 
beneficiaries and decisionmakers to internalize the value of ecosystem 
services in many ways.515  Despite the critical role the law plays in promoting 
ecosystem services, it is the least developed component in the literature on 
ecosystem services.516  Although the circumstances where the legal 
framework may boost or restrain the use of payments schemes are country 
specific, the law is certainly crucial for defining which services should be 
rewarded, and helpful for the design and implementation of PES. 
H. When PES is appropriate
1. When in Face of a Positive Externality
By its own definition, PES only makes sense when a positive 
externality exists.517  Having said that the ultimate purpose of PES is to 
obtain an improvement or conservation of ecosystem services where the 
activity does not generate profits despite delivering valuable ecosystem 
services, the ideal situation for implementing a PES is in a privately 
unprofitable but socially valuable activity.518  In contrast, where the activity is 
profitable but generates negative externalities then the best approach is 
usually the levy of a tax or charge.519  In such circumstances when the 
“polluter pays” principle can be clearly applied, a PES scheme should not be 
used; instead, regulation or taxation should be used.520  When the activity is 
profitable and socially valuable, PES can be combined with an ICDP-type 
strategy for point-wise interventions.521 
2. Opportunity Costs of Alternative Actions Are Equivalent or
Lower
If the approach is to offer a positive incentive, the service provider 
must see a net benefit. For that reason, when high threats correlate to 
514. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 43.
515. Thompson, supra note 39, at 479-485.
516. Ruhl, Kraft and Lant, supra note 11, at 9.
517. Börner et al., supra note 495, at 1273.
518. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 670.
519. Id.
520. Salzman, supra note 198, at 934.
521. Wunder, supra note 286, at 56.
 
West  Northwest, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 2012 
274 
elevated opportunity costs, PES are not appropriate because either the 
funds available cannot match the profitable alternate land use or the 
payments required would make this policy extremely inefficient when 
compared to other tools available.  Conversely, PES are unlikely to be 
effective in changing behaviors in activities where non-economic incentives 
drive the behavior.  Such incentives could include lack of credit, deficient 
technology, infrastructure, know-how, etc.522  Opportunity costs can be 
assessed using the so-called “costly to fake signals” format, meaning using 
information correlated with the opportunity cost that are expensive or 
difficult to fake.523 
Overall, PES is most effective “at the margin of profitability, when 
small payments to landowners can tip the balance in favor of the desired 
land use” and “can really make a difference in the intermediate range of 
positive but numerically small opportunity costs.”524  Some initiatives in the 
NYC Watershed Agreement provide an example of payments insufficient to 
match more profitable alternate land uses.  Due to political pressure, an 
initial plan to set a mandatory 200-foot setback from streams was turned 
into a voluntary, financially rewarded initiative.  However, since the payoffs 
offered were lower than the opportunity costs of growing crops along the 
most productive land, many farmers did not engage in the initiative.525  
Although this rationale is quite straightforward, Wunder calls attention 
to some complexities inherent in this analysis.  When deciding which land 
use to adopt, landowners are not exclusively driven by average profits but 
might be influenced by other factors such as risk, price fluctuations, 
expected future returns, legality of use, security of land tenure, and returns 
per labor input or capital unit invested rather than land unit.526  In sum, PES 
designers must be able to not only analyze opportunity costs of current land 
uses, but also anticipate emerging threats and their future rising costs, as 
accurately as possible, targeting PES to areas where they can really make a 
difference.527  
522. Wunder, supra note 23, at 10-11.
523. OECD, supra note 320, at 41.
524. Wunder, supra note 286, at 56.
525. Daily and Allison, supra note 390, at 80.
526. Wunder, supra note 23, at 11.
527. Id.
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3. Threats to Service Provision Are Legal and Legitimate
PES are usually appropriate when the activity that constitutes a threat 
for the provision of ecosystem services is legal and buyers want performance 
above current standards.  In this case, a typical example is when technology 
or performance based standards are in place to regulate air pollution, but 
administrators decide to pay for superior performance.528  Where the activity 
is mandatory or forbidden, it certainly must be enforced, at least, to not 
allow opportunity for environmental blackmail or perverse incentives.529  
There are other situations, however, where the activity that constitutes 
a threat is not regulated because the link between this activity and the loss 
of ecosystem services is not clear or cannot be easily individualized. 
Identifying the locus of nonpoint source pollution and quantifying its 
amount are examples of the challenges involved in regulation regarding 
pollution, aggravated by the fact that some polluting runoff occurs 
naturally.530  There are also situations where the local political and legal 
institutions don’t favor the regulation of certain activities.  A classic example 
of legitimate activity that most often faces political opposition is the case of 
nutrient runoff from farm activities, which poses a serious threat to water 
quality and the whole aquatic ecosystem.  Although one could imagine the 
feasibility of imposing mandatory buffer vegetation,531 restricting the use of 
pesticides and fertilizers, or installing riparian fences to prevent animal 
manure from flowing into the watercourse, these options are easier said 
than done.  The problem related to non-point source pollution — where 
nutrient runoff is one of the examples — exposes the difficulties in 
regulating scattered sources, demonstrating the relationship between the 
activity and the ecosystem service degradation and the intricacies in coping 
528. Salzman, supra note 199, at 143.
529. There are examples of PES for forest conservation where deforestation is
illegal on grounds of weak or nonexistent enforcement. 
530. Miller, Powers and Elder, supra note 184, at 799.
531. In Brazil, although there is mandatory buffer zone, Law No. 4.471, 1965,
Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] (Braz.), landholders are not required to restore areas 
already degraded, where perpetrators cannot be identified or the statute of 
limitations for liability applies. In such situations, there are opportunities for the use 
of PES. Available at http://www.senado.gov.br/legislacao (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). 
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with political pressure.532  In such circumstances, the use of persuasion and 
payments might be the only real arrow left in the policy quiver.533  
4. Other Policies Fail to Secure Ecosystem Service Provision
The reasons why other policies fail to secure ecosystem service 
provision are varied and site-specific, but those commonly cited in the 
literature are summarized below.  
Ecosystem services geography usually does not match political 
boundaries.534  In a watershed protection scheme, it is not unusual that a 
watershed crosses several municipalities or even surpasses state borders.  In 
the United States, local zoning is the rule and comprehensive land use 
planning is the exception.535  Therefore, administrators lack authority to 
regulate and enforce activities in areas outside their political jurisdiction. 
Even when environmental managers have the authority to tax or 
regulate, these mechanisms can fail either because institutions are weak or 
absent, because they face strong political opposition, or because they 
perform less efficiently when compared to payment schemes.  In some 
developing countries where institutions are weak and regulation is weakly 
enforced, there are examples of payments for forest conservation where 
deforestation is illegal.536  In these cases, logic would recommend that 
command and control regulations simply be enforced, and that penalties be 
imposed on violators  — however, the reality is that there is no enforcement 
or it is too weak.537  Faced with such a situation, one wonders how PES could 
be effective and efficient in the absence of monitoring and enforcement. 
Some authors argue that where regulation is weakly enforced, it is easier to 
secure cooperation from land users when offering carrots rather them 
threatening them with sticks.538  In addition, by raising the value of 
conserved resources, PES can raise the local communities’ incentives to 
532. In the United States, the difficulties in regulating nonpoint sources are
more related to political opposition than to scientific limitations.  See Salzman, supra 
note 198, at 929. 
533. Id. at 912-14. Salzman describes the situation faced by the Sydney
Catchment Authority in Australia, dealing with eutrophication in the Wingecarribee 
Reservoir. 
534. See supra note 8.
535. Plater, supra note 135, at 1217.
536. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205 at 669.
537. Wunder, supra note 286, at 49.
538. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 669.
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self-enforce existing regulations, thereby helping to overcome the lack of 
state enforcement.539  
There are also cases where regulation faces strong political opposition. 
The agricultural lobbies in many countries have historically been successful 
in opposing any initiative that restricts the use of agricultural land or 
imposes higher costs for environmental protection.540, 541, 542  Salzman draws a 
parallel with nonbinding international law and argues that when regulators 
are unable to regulate because there is no authority or the rule is not 
enforced for political reasons, the “beneficiary pays” principle rather than 
the “polluter pays” principle is more likely to succeed.543 
Finally, the use of PES presupposes that this policy shall be more cost 
effective than other mechanisms available.  “PES efficiency is not only 
determined by the extent to which incremental ES are provided, but also by 
the cost at which this was achieved.”544  Prescriptive regulation must address 
the broadest number of situations in the regulated community, 
notwithstanding whether the number of land management practices that 
really make a difference in service provision tends to be much smaller.  This 
is an example of the “80/20 rule” i.e., where eighty percent of the effects 
come from twenty percent of the regulated community.545  As a result, 
prescriptive regulation tends to be overinclusive and more likely to be 
inefficient when compared to targeted PES, especially for discrete service 
provision.546  From another standpoint, to set the appropriate level of 
regulation or the price to be borne by the undesirable activity governments 
need to gather information, and this process is usually costly lengthy, and 
ineffective.  According to the United Nations World Water Development 
539. Id.
540. Salzman, supra note 198, at 929.
541. If the agricultural lobby is too powerful to be defeated (assuming they
were not challenged before the WTO), Professor Salzman presents a pragmatic 
solution that has been debated in the United States.  Instead of going to subsidize 
the production of agricultural goods, these funds could be channelled to the 
provision of ecosystem services.  See Salzman, supra note 199, at 150. 
542. In Brazil, there is a recent move orchestrated by the agricultural coalition
to change the Brazilian Forest Code, reducing the mandatory riparian buffer zone, 
among other things.  Richard Blaustein and Chris Santiago, Will Brazil Change its Forest 
Code – and Kill the Amazon Rainforest? (2010) http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0922-
ecosystem_marketplace_forest_cost.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). 
543. Salzman, supra note 198, at 927-28.
544. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408, at 847.
545. Salzman, supra note 198, at 922.
546. Id. at 923-924.
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Report 3, the charges levied on polluters had only a slight impact on 
behavior, because such charges are rarely set high enough.547  The most 
efficient way to gather this information is in a PES scheme where providers 
know their properties and opportunity costs and can express which services 
they can provide and at which cost.548  Governments, in turn, know which 
type of land use changes they are seeking and their willingness to pay for 
this.549  As a result, information exchange in a PES scheme is more efficient 
than in a regulatory approach where the information exchange is usually a 
one-way discussion and information on the less costly land-use alternatives 
is missed.550  Salzman argues that PES is more attractive than regulation or 
taxation when faced with high information costs.551  When information costs 
are low, so are the savings from such a policy, so it is not worth the potential 
problems of PES such as moral hazards and rent seeking.552  This dynamic of 
information cost exchange might well be true in PES schemes introduced in 
Australia553 or even in the United States, but it is not the reality in many 
developing countries where insufficient skills, information asymmetry and 
weak institutions are commonplace.554  As a result, Wunder recommends 
that the adoption of a PES should be preceded by a realistic assessment of 
how efficiently other tools could work.555  A general conclusion that might be 
applied to both developed and developing countries is that practices which 
are privately profitable but which generate negative externalities or do not 
add value in terms of environmental services are best addressed by taxes 
and fees.556  Salzman reaches the same conclusion when he states “it does 
seem harder to argue that society should demand generation of positive 
externalities without payment.”557 
547. UNESCO-WWAP, supra note 1, at 145.
548. Salzman, supra note 198, at 916-17.





554. Landell-Mills and Porras, supra note 219.
555. Wunder, supra note 286, at 55.
556. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 670.
557. Salzman, supra note 198, at 954.
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5. When the Services Are Threatened But Not Yet Lost and
Decisions Are on the Edge
When targeting PES, buyers should focus not only on areas with 
current threats, but also on areas with projected threats because sometimes 
threats are only unambiguously revealed when it is too late.558  PES buyers, 
either government or users, essentially compete with other opportunity 
costs.  As a result, it is perceived that PES schemes have a higher 
effectiveness when the scarcity of a particular ecosystem service is perceived 
but the service has not yet been lost and decisions are still “on the edge.”559  
Using as an example a conservation project in Indonesia where the local 
community was suffering pressure to sell their logging rights, Wunder argues 
that, “once the balance has tipped and the community has sold off logging 
rights, it is obviously too late for PES to have any impact.”560 
6. When Property Rights Are Clearly Defined and Enforced
While some authors argue that PES may contribute to the 
formalization of property rights,561 the vast majority argue that they are 
appropriate when land owners providing ecosystem services effectively have 
the right to exclude other uses,562 and this right to exclude usually demands 
formal land tenure.  Land managers do not always have formal land tenure, 
particularly in the tropics,563 and this situation puts them in a weak situation 
in terms of excluding others.  Although scholars don’t attach formal land 
tenure as an essential element of payment schemes, the reality indicates 
that unless informal landowners can effectively control access and exclude 
others for using the land, the service in that particular area should not be 
subject to a PES agreement.564  
558. Wunder, supra note 23, at 12.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Forest Trends, supra note 387, at 10.
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I. Potentials and Caveats
1. Implements the Precautionary and Intergenerational
Equity Principles
By assessing current and future threats, PES aims to change behaviors 
when the services are threatened but not lost and decisions are on the 
edge.565  Therefore, by preventing future environmental degradation PES 
provides an insurance against future degradation,566 to the benefit of future 
generations.  As a result, PES implements both the precautionary567 and 
intergenerational equity principles.568  In addition, it offers a more cost-
effective solution in terms of conservation, since protecting ecosystems is 
usually cheaper than restoring them with funds from taxes or fines, 
assuming such restoration is even feasible.569  As the State of Watershed 
Payments Report points out, the city of Santa Fe is the first in the United 
States to use payments for ecosystem services as an insurance against 
future threats to the water supply.570  The Santa Fe Municipal Watershed 
Plan 2010-2029 also stresses that “it is unique in that it seeks to fund forest 
restoration activities using the Payment for Ecosystem Services model as an 
insurance policy against future threats, particularly that of catastrophic fire, 
to the municipal water supply.”571  
565. Wunder, supra note 23, at 12.
566. Wunder, supra note 286, at 54, 56.
567. The Precautionary Principle is stated in Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration as “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach 
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”  United Nations, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 3 
- 14 June 1992, available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp
?documentid=78&articleid=1163 (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
568. The intergenerational equity principle was mentioned in principles 1 and
2 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (1972) and stated in 
principle 3 of the Rio Declaration as “[t]he right to development must be fulfilled so 
as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future 
generations.”  Id. 
569. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408, at 844.
570. Stanton et al., supra note 247, at 46.
571. Tori Derr et al., The Santa Fe Municipal Watershed Plan 2010-2029 (2009),
http://www.santafenm.gov/DocumentView.aspx?DID=4354 (last visited Sept. 10, 
2011). 
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2. Transitional Instrument
As already indicated, the law plays a crucial role in defining which 
practices should be rewarded with payments and which should not.  The law 
clearly changes and influences behaviors, but this process might face strong 
opposition.  Whenever there is political will to raise the duty of care over 
environmental protection and either drive landholders to internalize the 
costs or make taxpayers internalize the costs, PES can act as a bridge.572  In 
such circumstances, if the agency has a credible stick to be used soon, PES 
“act as ‘circuit breakers,’ easing the internalization of and transition to a 
higher duty of care.”573  J. B. Ruhl compares such payments to a “legislated 
extension of the constitutional backstop of regulatory takings law, providing 
compensation to the otherwise disadvantaged interests in order to 
ameliorate their economic losses and remove their opposition to the policy 
change.”574  Such an approach evidently assumes that regulation or taxation 
would be feasible and cost-effective, but not adopted for political 
opposition. 
3. Improve the Livelihood of the Poor
Since the rationality behind PES schemes is to offer a positive 
incentive for landholders to change environmentally damaging land uses, 
this increased source of income can, in theory, improve the livelihood of the 
local community when the landholders are poor.575  However, the policy 
initially was not conceptualized as a mechanism for poverty alleviation; 
rather, it was conceived as a policy to improve ecosystem service 
provision.576  Indeed, since the goal is to protect or enhance service 
provision, thereby targeting the poor — rather than the provider — with 
greater additionality, it may come at the detriment of the environmental 
policy goal.577  Even though poverty alleviation is a desired side effect, it 
should not be the primary objective, otherwise PES might be “subsumed 
into the generic family of altruistic development projects to which they were 
572. Salzman, supra note 198, at 949-952.
573. Id. at 951.
574. Ruhl, Kraft and Lant, supra note 11, at 263.
575. Although PES are usually small, they can be relatively important when
few alternative cash sources exist. See Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408, 
at 850. 
576. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 671-72.
577. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408, at 850-51.
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actually meant to be an alternative.”578  Despite this theory, in all 
government financed PES examined by Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, there 
was at least one additional goal, other than ecosystem service provision, 
and the most common goal was poverty alleviation.579  PES is also believed 
to increase the “social capital” of the poor by improving social organization 
and disseminating knowledge on sustainable resource practices.580 
Despite these advantages, the poor face some structural constraints 
when it comes to participating in PES schemes.  The very poor usually lack 
property rights over the parcels of land that provide ecosystem services and, 
therefore, would be barred from participation, unless they had effective de 
facto control over the area.581  Additionally, this parcel of land usually 
provides the means for their livelihood and the adoption of a use restricting 
PES scheme might cut this informal sector income 582  Furthermore, if high 
transaction costs are a limitation for general PES participation, they 
constitute a greater obstacle for the poor.583  When payments are transferred 
through markets, constraints increase.  Poor people usually possess 
inadequate skills, education and information, which reflects in a power 
asymmetry to their disservice.584  In addition, regulatory institutions in many 
developing countries tend to be weak, which tends to increase transaction 
costs and render information and information systems inadequate.585  The 
implications of transaction costs are addressed in the next topic, but some 
authors suggest that, in the face of these circumstances, simpler payment 
schemes are likely to be most effective.586  
With these caveats, it might be argued that PES schemes, when well 
administered and continuously funded, offer an additional source of income 
for the poor that are often more stable than other alternative sources, 
particularly in disadvantaged regions.587  In the cases analyzed by Wunder, 
Engel and Pagiola, poor people were able to access the program and 
become service providers, although the data is insufficient to assess to what 
578. Wunder, supra note 23, at 22.
579. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408 ,at at 849-50.
580. Wunder, supra note 23, at 18; Forest Trends, supra note 387, at 10.
581. Wunder, supra note 23, at 17.
582. Id. at 20.
583. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 672.
584. Landell-Mills and Porras, supra note 219, at 216.
585. Id. at 215-217.
586. Id. at 218.
587. Wunder, supra note 23, at 18.
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degree they effectively benefited from them.588  Although perhaps it is not 
yet clear whether PES can make the poor better off, at the very least it is 
clear that PES will not make them worse off. 
Concerns were raised as to whether these schemes could constitute a 
“PES trap,” where service providers are surprised by underestimated or 
changing opportunity costs and find it burdensome to maintain the 
agreement.589  Although buyers are usually in a better negotiation position, 
for the sustainability of the agreement it is crucial that the sellers have a 
good comprehension of the implication of the contract, which can be 
provided by organizations working on the agreement.590  It is also highly 
recommended that a renegotiation or exit clause be included, so that the 
service providers can pull out or renegotiate the terms if changing 
conditions induce them to do so.591 
4. High Transaction Costs
Although transaction costs are site and service specific and depend on 
several variables, some general conclusions can be drawn.  Government-
financed PES tends to be more cost-effective than user-financed PES, 
because of economies of scale in transaction costs.592  These economies of 
scale, however, might be achieved at the cost of lower ecosystem service 
values.  “In general, transaction costs are highest when many smallholders 
and multiple PES actors are involved, when institutions and property rights 
are weak, and when costs of getting baseline information and of monitoring 
land use and service provision are high.”593  These constraints largely affect 
the poor, small landholders who usually do not control (or have weak) land 
tenure.594  “Start up costs tends to be more prohibitive than running costs 
especially for pilot schemes.”595  In addition, payments for ecosystem 
services do not overcome the additional cost of regulation,596 but rather 
might have to incorporate it.  At the same time, only part of the high start-
up transaction costs is truly specific to PES, such as the costs to negotiate 
588. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408, at 850.
589. Wunder, supra note 23, at 18.
590. Id.
591. Wunder, supra note 286, at 50.
592. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 666.
593. Wunder, supra note 286, at 52.
594. Wunder, supra note 23, at 17.
595. Wunder, supra note 286, at 53.
596. Thompson, supra note 42, at 470.
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and close the agreement.597  Most of the costs involved to assess potential 
service provisions, their values, and enforcement are also inherent to other 
policies, such as command and control or taxes.598 
To bundle small landholders and achieve economies of scale some 
creative schemes have been tested599 such as bubble projects for carbon 
sequestration,600 but at the cost of lower service delivery targeting and 
additionality.601  With few exceptions bundling and layering ecosystem 
services have remained an unattainable goal because such services face the 
same sort of constraints that single schemes face, but to a greater degree.602  
Nevertheless, research conducted in Guatemala concluded (with several 
caveats) that when areas of interest for biodiversity conservation overlap 
with areas of potential watershed services, PES can make a significant 
contribution for biodiversity services.603 
5. Negatively Impacts Social Norms in Conservation
An oft-cited concern is that commercial conservation might erode 
culturally rooted, not-for-profit conservation values.604  Scholars who studied 
several payment schemes argue that PES may undermine intrinsic 
motivations for conservation and debilitate preexisting social markets.605  
There is also a concern that government financed PES send the message 
that environmental stewardship is a duty of governments rather than 
individuals and this discourages initiatives made without profit purposes.606  
Although the Leopoldian land ethic607 is a desirable goal, it is not clear 
whether and how PES could be more harmful to the development of social 
597. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408, at 849.
598. Id.
599. For a comprehensive list of proposed institutional innovations to reduce
transaction costs, see Forest Trends, supra note 387 at 45. 
600. Wunder, supra note 23, at 17.
601. Wunder, supra note 286, at 53.
602. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 667.
603. Stefano Pagiola et al., Can Payments for Watershed Services Help Finance
Biodiversity Conservation? A Spatial Analysis of Highland Guatemala, 2:1 J. OF NAT. RESOURCES
POL’Y RES. 7, 20 (2010). 
604. Salzman, supra note 198, at 946-47.
605. Wunder, supra note 23, at 14-15.
606. Salzman, supra note 198, at 946-47.
607. An allusion to the American conservationist Aldo Leopold, see Salzman,
supra note 198, at 946. 
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norms on conservation than are other existing policy tools.608  In any 
circumstance, however, “PES implementation should be preceded by an 
efficient analysis of existing approaches and motivation for ecosystem 
services.”609  
6. Hold Out, Moral Hazards, and Perverse Incentives
Depending on the service and the land context, the refusal of one 
landowner to participate in the scheme may frustrate the effective delivery of 
the ecosystem service.610  As long as the reasons for not participating are 
related to higher opportunity costs or some others constraints previously 
related, the problem is less a concern of policy design and more one of a 
wrong policy choice.  What makes policy designers frown, however, is the 
risk of deliberate holdout and collusion with the purpose of raising the price 
of payments.  The holdout problem is more a concern regarding biodiversity 
than regarding water quality because the effectiveness of achieving 
watershed protection is less likely to be threatened by the actions of a few 
landowners.611  Nevertheless, it is an issue that deserves attention and 
Professor James Salzman states that it is unlikely to happen when the 
reverse auction is competitive and there is selective information disclosure 
on service score to the sellers.612 
According to Wunder, the ideal environmental service seller is a 
potentially environmentally nasty.613  Under this circumstances, how to avoid 
a problem of “moral hazard?”614  How to avoid the creation of perverse 
subsidies and achieve the policy goal at the same time?  
While targeting ecosystem services based solely on efficiency may 
raise a problem of moral hazard, Professor Salzman argues that “neither 
subsidies nor markets are based on equity.”615  In contrast, non-Coasean 
proponents argue that efficiency and equity are usually intertwined, and that 
the choice of the fairness criterion may be critical for determining this 
608. Salzman, supra note 198, at 947.
609. Wunder, supra note 23, at 14.
610. Salzman, supra note 198, at 939-940.
611. Id. at 940.
612. Id.
613. Sven Wunder, Environmental Services: Some Nuts and Bolts, CIFOR OCCASIONAL 
PAPER NO. 42 (2005) at 12. 
614. Id. at 942-43.
615. Salzman, supra note 199, at 144.
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interdependency and the PES outcomes.616  If equity cannot be ignored in a 
PES design, how it should be weighed against efficiency deserves further 
investigation.617 
Although it is generally agreed that it is essential to remove perverse 
subsidies for PES (or any other policy) effectiveness,618 here the concern is 
slightly different.  What must be avoided is the creation of perverse 
incentives that are induced by payment schemes, a situation where 
landowners would deliberately delay improving land management practices, 
or even worsen them in expectation of future payments.619  While the 
criticism that subsidies might end up rewarding the behavior they are 
aiming to suppress is not without reason, this is less of a concern in 
payment schemes620 because the sums are usually small and the costs for 
restoring an ecosystem deliberately degraded are probably not recoverable 
by payments.621  Nevertheless, to avoid such type of environmental 
blackmail, setting the baseline in a reasonable period prior to the design 
and implementation of the scheme might be a helpful safeguard measure.622 
Since PES contains many elements of subsidization it is helpful and 
advisable to learn from the comments and recommendations made by the 
Council on Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle to EOCD 
countries. The Council states that the conditions under which governmental 
aid, including subsidies, are acceptable and are considered not to infringe 
the Polluter-Pays Principle623 are: i) not turning the subsidy into a perverse 
subsidy, ii) clearly framing the policy goal and iii) adequately targeting the 
ecosystem service payments.  It can also be argued that “uncontroversial 
subsidies are those where the positive spillovers generated by the supported 
activities contribute to clearly identifiable public goods.”624   
616. Unai Pascual et al., Exploring the Links Between Equity and Efficiency in
Payments for Environmental Services: A Conceptual Approach, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1237 
(2010). 
617. Id. at 1243.
618. OECD, supra note 320, at 48.
619. Salzman, supra note 198, at 944-45.
620. Id. at 945.
621. Id. at 946.
622. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205 at 668.
623. OECD Recommendation C (74) 223.
624. Keppler, supra note 209, at 193.
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IV. Conclusion
Biodiversity and freshwater ecosystems provide a range of invaluable
services to our society.  Drinking water is essential for the survival of all 
living organisms.  Photosynthesis, which provides primary production and 
supports the entire food chain, would not occur without water.  For these 
most basic needs there is no substitute.  Freshwater ecosystems and the 
services they provide made possible the incredible economic development 
achieved in the past centuries.  These services are required for food (rain fed 
or irrigation systems) and energy production.  They are also needed in the 
industrial sector.  Aquatic ecosystems sustain fisheries and provide raw 
material for pharmaceutical products and bioengineering.  They still provide 
nonmaterial benefits, such as cultural, artistic, spiritual, recreational and 
aesthetic services.  To deliver all these services that are critical for life 
support, welfare and economic growth, nature depends upon having water 
as well as functioning ecosystems.  Once natural ecosystem needs are met, 
freshwater ecosystems provide a wide variety of regulating and supporting 
services ranging from regulation of hydrological flow to wildlife habitat.  
Despite the significant social, economic and cultural value provided by 
healthy freshwater ecosystems, they have been dramatically altered in the 
past fifty years (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment).625  The natural capital 
that supports all these functions, processes and benefits have ecological 
limits that, once exceeded, lead to a diminution and eventually loss of 
ecosystem services.  The indirect drives of change identified by the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment are economic development and 
population growth.626  The major identified direct drivers of change for 
freshwater ecosystems are water diversion, pollution (especially from 
nutrient loading), and invasive species, followed by land use changes and 
unsustainable withdrawals.627  When considered in terms of a global 
perspective, the existing amount of renewable freshwater is able to sustain 
human as wells as ecosystem needs.  However, as modern societies 
withdraw, divert, pollute or otherwise impair freshwater ecosystems, they 
limit the quantity and the capacity of these ecosystems to provide the 
services upon which we all depend.  
Notwithstanding several scientific publications that drew the attention 
of the general public to the importance of ecosystem services for life-
support and welfare, the task of incorporating these values into decision-
625. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2 at 31-32.
626. Id. at 64.
627. Id. at 332.
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making processes remains unaddressed.  To tackle ecosystem degradation 
and loss, policy makers have a variety of tools; the application of such 
mechanisms, however, is shaped by some challenges.  The characteristic of 
public goods displayed by most ecosystem services is a challenge already 
known and tested in several policies.  This characteristic results in over-
consumption or underproduction, because there are no mechanisms to 
restrict the use and reward the production, causing a so called “externality.” 
The new challenges related to ecosystem services are their inherent 
complexity and our partial knowledge regarding the links between structures 
and functions.  Another complication is the lack of a price mechanism to 
signal the scarcity or degradation of these services.  Since such services do 
not have a market value, economists have developed alternative 
mechanisms to estimate such economic value.  As seen above, this is not a 
simple task, since it is affected by the complexity of the subject being 
evaluated; it also involves ethical considerations and implies some trade-
offs.  
Among the toolkit of policies for environmental protection, PES 
emerged as an instrument designed to internalize positive externalities. 
Justified under the “beneficiary pays” principle, rather than the “polluter 
pays” principle, this policy provides a positive incentive to ensure the 
provision of ecosystem services, conditional to their delivery.  Initially 
perceived as a market-based mechanism, it ultimately received a distinct 
and unique place in the policy toolbox, as several diverse schemes were 
tested in both developed and developing countries.  Received by some as a 
win-win solution to promote both conservation and sustainable use of 
natural resources, it is, instead, a policy that recognizes hard trade-offs and 
is appropriate for a limited set of conditions.  PES has gained momentum 
not because it is a catchphrase, but because there is a real need for better 
ecosystem service management. 
To deliver their promises, PES schemes must address three minimum 
elements: the approach must use a positive incentive to drive the intended 
behavior, transferred to the service providers as cash, in-kind or both.  This 
positive incentive must be offered conditionally to the return of an ecosystem 
service provision.  The service provision is delivered by actions (usually land 
use practices) to protect or enhance an ecosystem service.  Subsumed within these 
three elements, a set of factors must be in place for this policy to be cost-
effective.  The service provision must be in addition to a preestablished 
baseline, and the scheme must contain mechanisms to avoid leakage and 
ensure permanence.  The design of the scheme must also contain provisions 
for monitoring, reporting, and safeguarding against holdouts and perverse 
incentives.  Although many payments are made on a uniform basis, it is well 
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recognized that targeting payments according to different values and costs 
provides the greatest cost-effectiveness.  This approach, however, may raise 
the transaction costs and pose problems of equity.  Since efficiency and 
equity are usually intertwined, the relationship between them must still be 
better explored.  
Adopting this framework, PES is an appropriate policy when policy 
makers are faced with a positive externality, since negative externalities are 
best addressed by taxes or regulation.  For this approach to be seen as a real 
positive incentive by service providers, the “carrot” offered must at least be 
equivalent to alternative opportunity costs.  In other words, when the funds 
available do not match the profits of alternative land practices, it is unlikely 
that service providers will engage, and the proposal of such a policy might 
be a waste of resources.  This policy should only be applied when the 
activity which represents a threat to the service provision is legal and 
policymakers seek performance above current standards; otherwise, the 
solution is just enforcement of current regulations.628  The use of PES is also 
widely justified in situations where other policies have failed.  The reasons 
for the failure of other policies can be credited to the lack of authority to tax 
or regulate, weak or inexistent institutions, strong political opposition to a 
legislative change, or inefficiency of those policies because the information 
gathering process necessary to tax or regulate is too costly or unjustified for 
discrete service provision.  Finally, PES is defensible when service providers 
have the right to effectively exclude others from land use.  Although it might 
be achieved when land holders have de facto, rather than de jure control over 
the lot of land, the right to exclude usually entails formal land tenure.  For 
all these characteristics, PES makes sense when service provisions are 
threatened but not yet lost and decisions are on the edge.629  As a result, the 
design of the program must include the assessment of areas under 
forecasted threat. 
Having said that, it seems that PES is a valuable policy tool that 
implements both the precautionary and intergenerational equity principles, 
because it aims to anticipate and alter actions that would result in 
ecosystem service loss.  By doing so, it not only avoids predictable and 
unpredictable changes and losses resulting from land use changes, but also 
provides insurance against future degradation, to the benefit of future 
628. Nevertheless there are reports of payments made to avoid illegal
activities, justified under context of specific grounds that might not replicate. 
629. Sven Wunder, Environmental Services: Some Nuts and Bolts, CIFOR OCCASIONAL 
PAPER NO. 42 (2005) at 12. 
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generations.  It is also economically sound, because protecting ecosystems 
is usually cheaper than restoring them with funds from taxes or fines. 
Despite these potentials, PES still presents some doubts and 
challenges to be addressed.  It is not yet clear whether this policy improves 
the livelihood of the poor. Although it was not designed as a poverty 
alleviation policy, it certainly cannot make the poor worse off.  In addition, 
PES applied in developing countries usually involves concerns over equity 
that cannot be ignored.  The more effective the program in delivering service 
provisions, the higher the transaction costs are likely to be.  Nevertheless, it 
must be pointed out that many of these transaction costs are inherent to 
any other considered policy.  High transaction costs dwarf the efficiency of 
the policy and represent a strong limitation concerning the participation of 
the poor.  Careful consideration must be given during the assessment and 
design of the program, so as not to undermine intrinsic motivations for 
ecosystem protection and not allow the formation of perverse incentives. 
Overall, PES must be applied strategically, filling the gaps where other 
policies fail to deliver ecosystem provisions in a cost-effective manner.  It is 
certainly limited in scope, and the challenges from translating theory to field 
remain but the promises are rewarding.  Considering the role played by the 
law to either boost or restrains the application and effectiveness of payment 
schemes, this topic deserves further analysis, given that it is the least 
developed component in the ecosystem services’ literature.630  This paper 
has aimed to provide useful information for policy makers seeking to design 
and implement payment schemes.  
630. Ruhl, Kraft and Lant, supra note 11, at 9.
